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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the process of the establishment of the Russian Administration 
in the occupied territories of the Ottoman Empire, in the course of the First World 
War. This thesis is divided into 5 chapters. Following the first chapter, which 
describes the background of the military occupation of the Ottoman territories by the 
Russian Army, the second chapter analyses the formation of the temporary Russian 
administration. Relying on archival documents, contemporary newspapers, and 
diaries of the Russian officials in charge, this chapter traces the projects for the 
establishment of the Russian political, judicial, and financial systems, and for the 
colonization of the occupied territories. Chapter three focuses on the activities of 
philanthropic societies from the Russian Empire in the occupied regions. In the 
fourth chapter, the emphasis is given to the various scientific explorations conducted 
by Russian scientists in the occupied areas. Finally, the fifth chapter is devoted for 
the conclusion, where, the process of the formation of the Russian administration in 
the occupied Ottoman territories is interpreted in line with the peculiar Russian 
colonial process of osvoenie. 
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ÖZET 
Bu çalışmada, Birinci Dünya Harbi esnasında Rus Ordusu tarafından işgal 
edilen Osmanlı topraklarında tesis olunan geçici Rus idaresinin faaliyetleri 
incelenmiştir. 5 bölümden müteşekkil tezin ilk bölümünde doğu ve kuzey doğu 
Anadolu’nun askerî işgal safhası izâh edildikten sonra, ikinci bölümde Geçici Rus 
İdaresi’nin siyasî, adlî ve ekonomik sistemlerinin planları ve uygulamaları ile işgal 
edilen bölgelerde yürütülmesi düşünülen sömürge projeleri ve inşa faaliyetleri 
incelenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde savaş esnasında mağdur olan bölge halkına yönelik 
Rus İmparatorluğu sivil yardım kuruluşlarının yardım organizasyonları üzerinde 
durulmuştur. Dördüncü bölüm ise, Rus işgali süresince bölgede yapılan bilimsel 
çalışmalara ayrılmıştır. Tüm bu faaliyetler çerçevesinde, varılan sonuç, beşinci 
bölümde tartışılmıltır.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
Being on rival camps, the Ottoman and the Russian empires confronted one 
another at the Caucasian Front during the First World War. The Third and later the 
Second Turkish armies were severely defeated by the Russian Caucasian Army from 
the very beginning of the war and Turkey lost important territories to the victorious 
side. In the aftermath of successful military campaigns against Turkey on the 
Caucasian Front, the Russian armies occupied many cities of the eastern and 
northeastern Anatolia, such as Van, Bitlis, Muş, Erzurum, Erzincan, Gümüşhane, 
Bayburt and Trabzon by December 1916, and these cities, except Bitlis and Muş, 
remained under Russian occupation until spring 1918. 
Apart from the official Russian (Soviet) and Turkish (Republican) histories of 
the war, which comprehensively analyze the military campaigns at the Caucasian 
Front, historians focused especially on the controversial issue of the Armenian 
problem of the First World War years, including the period of Russian occupation. 
However, these years witnessed neglected but important events, which are still to a 
significant extent unknown. The Russian military and governmental authorities 
implemented a policy of annexation of the occupied regions, many philanthropic 
societies from the Russian Empire organized humanitarian aid, and an incredible 
number of Russian scientists conducted various scientific explorations in the region. 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to produce a historical narrative of the 
Russian attempts to construct the Temporary Administration of the Occupied 
Territories of Turkey, as well as the philanthropic and academic activities of the 
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Russian civilian organizations, after the successful military advance of the Russian 
army at the Caucasian Front between 1915-1917. 
The thesis is divided into 5 chapters. After the first chapter for introduction 
and background, the second chapter explores projects of the political, judicial and 
economic administration of the occupied regions and the colonization and 
exploitation efforts. This chapter mainly relies upon Russian archival documents. 
The colonization projects were traced in the documents of the Ministry of 
Agriculture at the Russian State Historical Archives in St. Petersburg. The same 
institution has the collections of the Council of Ministers, the ministries of Finance, 
and Industry and Trade. All these collections include substantial information on 
various aspects of the Russian colonial administration in occupied regions of Turkey.  
By focusing on the relief operations of the popular Russian philanthropic 
societies among the Muslim and Christian refugees in the occupied regions, the study 
seeks to describe these efforts in the third chapter. Publications of the Russian 
popular organizations, which are held in St. Petersburg at the National Library, and 
at the Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences, provided abundant material on 
the activities and the structure of the relief organizations in occupied regions.  
Following the two major chapters, the fourth chapter evaluates the works of 
the Russian scientists, especially archaeologists, in eastern and northeastern 
Anatolia. The St. Petersburg filial of the Archive of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences has valuable collections of the Russian academicians who had conducted 
intensive studies in occupied areas. The documents from this archive, alongside the 
publications of the Russian Academy of Sciences located in the Library of the 
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Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, and the visual documents preserved at the 
Photo Archive of the Institute of the History for Material Culture constitute the data 
for the fourth chapter of this study. In addition to the Russian archival materials, 
Trapezondskii Voyennyi Listok, the Russian newspaper published in Trabzon during 
the occupation period, and the memoirs of the Russian officials in charge of different 
posts in the occupied regions, provided firsthand information about the Russian 
activities of the time. After all, I tried to resume and conclude with analyses in the 
fifth chapter. 
Throughout the study, the titles of the sources, and names in Slavic languages 
are transliterated according to the modified Library of Congress transliteration 
system. In the period covered by this study, the Julian calendar was in use in the 
Russian Empire. The dates in the Julian calendar, in 20th century, were 13 days 
behind the Gregorian calendar used in the Western world. With regard to the dates 
used in the body of the text, I opted to convert all according to the Gregorian 
calendar, whereas in the footnotes I gave the dates of the newspapers as they were 
published, that is according to the Julian calendar. 
1.2 Background: The Caucasian Front 
The Ottoman Empire assumed a neutral position in the first months of the 
First World War, which had broken out on 29 July 1914. However, under strong 
German influence, the Ottoman government signed a secret treaty on August 2 
committing Turkey to the German side if Germany should have to take Austria-
Hungary's side against Russia. However, prudent politicians tried to avoid entry to 
the war, and it was after the controversial event of the purchase of two German battle 
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cruisers, Goeben and Breslau, when Turkey was dragged into the war. The Goeben 
led the Turkish fleet across the Black Sea to bombard Odessa and other Russian 
ports with a secret order from Enver Pasha, the War Minister on October 29-30. 
Russia declared war against Turkey on November 1 by an imperial decree, in which 
Nicholas II condemned the assault of Turkey and appraised the Russian armies 
before which stood the fulfillment “Russia’s historic mission on the shores of the 
Black Sea.”1 
Russian and Ottoman (Turkish) forces confronted each other at the 
“Caucasian Front” comprising two battlegrounds: Eastern Anatolia in the west, 
Iranian Azerbaijan in the east.2 State borders between Turkey and Russia had been 
delimitated by the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878. The Treaty of Berlin had confirmed the 
territorial gains of Russia stipulated in the Treaty of San Stefano (Yeşilköy), 
concerning Batum, Kars, Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu, whereas the Eleşkirt valley and 
Bayezid were reinstated to Turkey.3  
The Russian Army crossed the border and initiated an advance from 
Sarıkamış toward Erzurum in November 1914 just to be checked by the Ottoman 
forces in December. In return, the Turkish 3rd Army, under Enver Pasha, launched a 
major offensive against the Kars-Ardahan position4. The offensive ended up with a 
catastrophic defeat at Sarıkamış in January 1915. The exceptionally harsh winter 
                                                 
1 Vtoraya Otechestvennaya Voina: Po razskazam eya geroyev, (Petrograd: Izdanie sostoyaschogo pod 
Vysochaishim Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Gosudarya Imperatora pokrovitel’stvom 
Skobelevskogo Komiteta, 1916), p.108 
2 The engagements on the Azerbaijan battlegrounds are not mentioned in this study since they were 
fought outside the territory of Turkey. 
3 Anita L. P. Burdett ed., Caucasian Boundaries: Documents and Maps 1802-1946, (Slough:Archive 
Editions, 1996), p.292-293 
4 Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Kafkas Cephesi 3. Ordu Harekatı, Vol.2, book 1,( Ankara: Genel 
Kurmay Basımevi, 1993), p.383-384 
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circumstances devastated the ill-supplied and ill-led Turkish armies much more than 
the Russian Army (the Turkish 3rd Army was reduced in one month from 118,660 to 
12,400 men, whereas the actual combat casualties were only 30,000).5 As a result, 
the Turkish side lost its offensive capability. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Russian army achieved a considerable 
success on this front in the first months of the war, its situation on the main, (i.e., 
German) front was desperate. On the last days of 1914 the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Russian Army Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich applied to the British Admiralty 
with a request to undertake a diversive operation against the Turks, and to compel 
them to withdraw a part of their troops from the Caucasian front.6 Allured by the 
opportunities of knocking out an ally of Germany, and providing a stable route of 
supply for their Russian ally, the combined French and British fleets commenced an 
attack on the Dardanelles in February 1915. The naval attack and the subsequent 
land offensives throughout 1915 all failed, and the peninsula of Gelibolu had been 
evacuated by the allied troops between December 1915-January 1916.  
Although the Gelibolu campaign relieved some of the pressure off the 
Caucasian front, German armies penetrated more than two hundred miles into the 
Russian lines within two weeks with their offensive in May 1915 and triggered the 
collapse of the entire Russian Southern Front. The German and Austrian formations 
advanced northward and captured Warsaw in August 1915. In September, Germans 
attacked Courland towards Riga. As the entire Russian front line fell apart, the 
Russian strongholds of Novogeorgievsk Brest-Litovsk both fell to the Germans. 
                                                 
5 Köprülülü Şerif (İlden), Sarıkamış, (İstanbul: Türkiye İşbankası Kültür Yayınları, 2001); Alptekin 
Müderrisoğlu, Sarıkamış Dramı, (İstanbul: Kastaş, 1997) 
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Shortly after this, the Russian Tsar Nicholas II intervened and assumed personal 
command of the army, a decision that would have grave consequences. The Grand 
Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, the former Commander in Chief, was appointed to the 
command of the Caucasian Army.  
During 1915, the Turkish Army stood in the defensive position, and the 
Russian Army did not undertake a decisive offensive other than the occupation of the 
Van region in August 1915, by the active participation of special Armenian 
regiments in the Imperial Army and the Armenian population of the region. The 
Grand Duke and General Nikolai Nikolayevich Yudenich, the victor of Sarıkamış,7 
started a major assault along the Caucasian Front in January 1916 before the Turkish 
General Staff could deploy the experienced troops from the Gelibolu Front. The 
Turkish high command was not expecting a new winter campaign after the lessons of 
1914-1915 winter, however, the Russian Army took Erzurum, the most important 
fortified position of the Turkish defense on February 16, and later in 1916 occupied 
Trabzon on April 18, Erzincan on August 2, exhausting the combat capacity of the 
Turkish Third Army, commanded then by Vehib Pasha. The Turkish Second Army 
(transferred from the Gelibolu Front) in the same month launched a flanking 
offensive on the Bingöl-Kiğı-Ognot positions. Although the 16th army corps of the 
Second Army occupied Bitlis and Muş, later in August the Russians retook Muş and 
countered the Kiğı-Ognot offensive of the Second Army of Ahmet İzzet Pasha. This 
offensive was to be the last important Turkish attack on the Allies.8 As the military 
                                                                                                                                          
6 Robert Rhodes James, Grand Strategy: Gallipoli, (London: Papermac, 1989), p.17 
7 A. V. Shishov, Polkovodtsi Kavkazskikh Voin, (Moskva: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001), pp.493-550 
8 Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, 
(Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 2001), p.133 
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representative of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Turkey, Lieutenant Field-Marshal 
Joseph Pomiankowski stated “it may be considered that both Turkish Armies (the 
Third and Second) were, by the end of the winter [1916], in such a state that they 
would not have been able to resist any serious Russian attack. Fortunately for the 
Turks, on 9 March, the Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg and soon disorganized 
the Russian Caucasian Army and rendered its offensive action impossible.”9 The 
new position at the Caucasian Front was stabilized to Russia 's great advantage in the 
autumn, and was thereafter affected less by Russo-Turkish warfare than by the 
consequences of the revolution in Russia. The new front line between the Russian 
and Turkish armies traced to the west of Trabzon, passing from Tirebolu and turned 
south to Kelkit-Gümüşhane-Erzincan. This line continued to the southeast along the 
left side of the Ognotçay valley and to the Boğlan Pass and till the August offense of 
the Second Turkish Army comprised Bitlis and Muş alongside Van.10 
The territorial advance of the Russian armies in the northeastern parts of 
Anatolia opened up Allied negotiations on the partition of Turkey during the war 
years. The Allies concurred in with Russian demands concerning Istanbul in March 
1915;11 and in a series of secret agreements, the future of the Anatolian and Middle 
Eastern provinces of Turkey was predetermined.12 The occupied territories at the 
Caucasian front were promised to Russia in order to secure its consent to the Sykes-
Picot agreement on the future territorial gains of France and Britain in the Middle 
                                                 
9 Joseph Pomiankowski, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Çöküşü 1914-1918 I. Dünya Savaşı, tr. Kemal 
Turan, (İstanbul: Kayhan Yayınları, 1990), p.242 
10 W. E. D. Allen, Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-
Caucasian Border 1828-1921, (Cambridge: the University Press, 1953), p.440 
11 Valentin Alekseevich Emets, Ocherki Vneshnei Politiki Rossii 1914-1915, (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 
p.147 
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East. According to this agreement Russia was to obtain “the regions of Erzurum, 
Trabzon, Van and Bitlis up to a definite point on the coast of the Black Sea to the 
west of Trabzon.”13 Thus, the Russian Empire consolidated its war gains at the 
Caucasian Front while fighting to its end at the German Front. 
                                                                                                                                          
12 Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913-1923, (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1931), p. 137 
13 Evgenii Aleksandrovich Adamov ed., Razdel Aziatskoi Turtsii. Po sekretnym dokumentam byvshego 
ministerstva inostrannykh del, (Moscow: Litizdat NKID, 1924), p.185; “Razdel Turtsii”, Cbornik 
Sekretnykh Dokumentov iz Arkhiva Byvshogo Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, no.1, (Moscow: 
Tipografiya Komissariata po Inostrannym Delam, 1917), p.56 
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2. CHAPTER 2: RUSSIAN COLONIAL ACTIVITIES 
2.1 Administration of the Occupied Regions 
2.1.1 Early Regulations 
The acquisition of a wide and significant territory at the Caucasian Front 
became an indemnification to the Russian imperial government for the heavy defeats 
at the German Front. The area of the eastern, and northeastern Anatolia had been a 
subject of secret agreements among the Entente Powers, and was granted to Russia 
for future colonization. However, after the acquisition of a vast territory with a 
desperate population, Russian administration met considerable difficulties. Among 
them were the reestablishment of order, relief for the refugees, revitalization of the 
economy, as the main problems.  
The administration of the occupied regions, in the first months of the 
occupation, was undertaken by separate Russian military units and commanders in 
accordance with the 11th article of “Regulations about the field management of the 
army during war time”, which stated that the occupied region of the enemy would 
either be incorporated to the closest military district or there would be formed a 
separate military governor-generalship of these regions. In line with the military law, 
special institutions were to be founded for the civil administration of the occupied 
regions.1 The functions of the administrators of these military districts were vast and 
vague. The preparations for the supply of the army, the general reestablishment of 
the daily civil life and order in the region, the handling of the problems related with 
the evacuation of the wounded and sick, the management of all military and civil 
                                                 
1 A.Yu. Bakhturina, Politika Rossiiskoi Imperii v Vostochnoi Galitsii v godi Pervoi Mirovoi Voini, 
(Moscow:AIRO-XX, 2000), p.71 
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institutions in the region were all listed as issues to be coped with without further 
clarification. The Regulations assumed that similar functions would be assigned to 
the governors-general. The account on the hierarchy and submission of the civil and 
military officials was only mentioned in Article 14 as “all the civilian administrators 
in the theater of the military actions, submit to the senior commander of the 
respective military district or to the military governor-general.”2 In the occupied 
regions, separate military-administrative units were formed, such as the districts of 
Eleşkirt, Bayezîd, Diyadin, according to this regulation.3  
Later in 1915, The General Staff of the Caucasian Army promulgated a report 
to commanders on 6 December 1915 explaining the temporary administrative 
structure to be established in the occupied regions of Turkey. The region was divided 
into districts (okrug), the management of which was assigned to the officers 
dispatched by the order of the commander of the army. The delimitation of the 
borders of the okrugs were to be decided according to the administrative necessities 
and in line with the former delimitation during Ottoman rule, or depending upon the 
geographic or ethnographic requirements, in conformity with the instructions of the 
governor-general. The okrugs would then be divided into trade or administrative 
centers with appropriate special administrations similar to the village communities. 
At the head of each center or village community would be a responsible person 
among the native population, who would either be appointed by the commander of 
                                                 
2 For a detailed account on the Polozhenie o polevom upravlenii voisk v voennoe vremya, see R. Sh. 
Ganelin, M. F. Florinskii, Rossiiskaya gosudarstvennost' i pervaya mirovaya voina, (Moscow: N.p., 
1997), pp.11-13 
3 S. M. Akopyan, Zapadnaya Armeniya v Planakh Imperialisticheskikh Derzhav v Period Pervoi 
Mirovoi Voiny, (Erevan: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk Armyanskoi SSR), 1967, p. 171 
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the okrug or be elected by the local people with the approval of the commander of 
the okrug. 
The functions of the commander of an okrug were defined as military, 
administrative, and political tasks. The military functions included cooperation with 
the army for the supply of fodder and food, providing accommodation and labor for 
the construction of roads. The commander of the okrug had the right to resort to arms 
in order to maintain order and at his disposal would be 100 armed men. 
From the administrative aspect, the commander of an okrug was primarily 
responsible for the maintenance of order. Other administrative responsibilities 
included the supervision over all kinds of confiscation and the relations of the army 
with the population. Besides, he would appoint or dismiss civil servants. In his 
relations with the population, the commander had the powers of a governor-general. 
He had the right to arrest, to hand over the suspects to court. For the political 
functions of the commander of an okrug, it was written in the report that the 
commander was charged with implementing all the instructions given by the General 
Staff or by his seniors4. 
2.1.2 The 18 June 1916 Imperial Decree on the Administration of the Occupied 
Regions 
The report on the administration of the occupied regions prepared by the 
General Staff of the Caucasian Army in 1915 was temporary and would stay intact 
until Petrograd proclaimed special regulations for the establishment of the Russian 
rule in the conquered territories. In early 1915, General Aleksei Nikolayevich 
Kuropatkin from the Russian General Staff, and the State Council, prepared a project 
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for the annexation and administration of the occupied territories. Kuropatkin 
envisaged two governor-generalships, namely those of Erzurum and Sivas, in the 
occupied regions of Turkey. The governor-generalship of Erzurum would include 
Erzurum, Harput, Bitlis, Van, Diyarbekir (Diyarbakır) and Trabzon (excluding the 
sancak of Canik), whereas the governor-generalship of Sivas would consist of Sivas, 
Kastamonu vilayets and of the sancak of Canik. According to Kuropatkin, the 
administration of the occupied regions would be based on the Russian project of the 
Armenian reforms of 1914, which had envisaged the formation of an inspector-
generalship in the six vilâyets of eastern Anatolia.5 
Finally, an Imperial decree on 18 June 1916, concerning ‘The Rules for the 
Temporary Administration of Areas of Turkey Occupied in Accordance with the 
Law of War’, established the military Governor-Generalship of the occupied 
territories of Turkey, for the purpose of the unification, surveillance and guidance of 
the military institutions in the region, and the establishment of the Russian 
administration.6 Although the project of Kuropatkin was not applied, the Military 
Governor-Generalship of the occupied regions of Turkey roughly corresponded to 
the boundaries of the prospective Erzurum Governor-Generalship of the project. The 
borders of the Military Governor-Generalship were determined in the north as the 
                                                                                                                                          
4 A. O. Arutyunyan, Kavkazskii Front 1914-1917, (Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Aiestan, 1971), pp.356-357 
5 The Armenian Reforms of 1912-1914: As a result of long negotiations among the Great Powers, a 
compulsory plan for reformations in Eastern Anatolia was dictated to the Ottoman Government and 
an agreement between Russian and Ottoman governments was signed in February 1914. Upon this 
agreement two administrative units in the six provinces of eastern Anatolia, and Trabzon were 
formed. Each unit would be ruled by a European inspector-general, who would be appointed with the 
consent of the Great Powers. See: Roderic H. Davison, “The Armenian Crisis (1912-1914)”, The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 53, Issue 3, (April, 1948), pp.481-505 
6 “Prikaz Nachalnika Shtaba Verhovnogo Glavnokomanduyuschogo, 5 iunya 1916 No: 739: Pri sem 
obyavlyaetsya vremennoe polozhenie ob upravlenii oblastyami Turtsii, zanyatimi po pravu 
voiny”.[from here on: Prikaz No.739] p.2, Russian State History Archive (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvenno-
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previous Turkish-Russian state borders, in the east according to the previous 
Turkish-Iranian state borders The Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army, the 
Viceroy (Namestnik) at the Caucasus, Nikolai Nikolayevich, issued a special order 
describing the western and southern border line, which would follow the borders of 
the fortified region of Trabzon-the mountain of Sürmene- the village of Koğans, the 
passes of Cevizdere and Kalyangedik, the mountain of Bingöl, the villages of Kop 
and Adilcevazkale, the northern and eastern shores of lake Van till the mouth of 
Hoşabsu river, and from there through Koturçay till the Turkish-Iranian border.7 
The Military Governor-Generalship consisted of the General Staff, 
Chancellery, military-sanitary administration, technical department, department of 
taxation, and the department of control, and was headquartered in Tiflis. The 
Military Governor-Generalship was to be transferred to the occupied regions. 
Erzurum and Trabzon were offered to host the residence of the Military Governor-
Generalship. However, in the face of difficulties of communication and transport, 
and due to the special legal status of Trabzon as a fortified region headed by a major 
general,8 prevented the realization of these proposals, and the Military Governor-
generalship stayed in Tiflis throughout the occupation period.9 The territory of the 
Military Governor-Generalship would be divided into regions (oblast) and districts 
                                                                                                                                          
Istoricheskii Arkhiv, St. Petersburg. Hereafter cited as RGIA), Fond 1284, opis 47, delo 165, lists. 3-21 
reverse.  
7 Akopyan, ibid, p.171 
8 Trabzon region was the westernmost position on the Russian-Turkish frontline, so it was designed as 
a fortified region separate from the Military Governor-Generalship of the occupied regions of Turkey 
and its administration was bestowed on a major general. However, the nachalnik of the fortified 
region was appointed by the Military Governor-General of the occupied regions of Turkey. (For 
detailed information on the administration of Trabzon see the fourth chapter of this study.)  
9 RGIA Fond 560 opis 28 delo 518 lists 20-20 reverse. 
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(okrugs). The administration of these units was entrusted to the military governors of 
the oblasts and to the chiefs (nachalnik) of the okrugs.10  
It was stated in Prikaz No. 739 that, the borders and the number of the oblasts 
and the okrugs, would be determined corresponding to the previous administrative 
delimitation of the region, as far as possible. Depending on the progress of the 
military operations and on the consideration of administrative convenience, the 
Military Governor-General had the right to alter the borders of the oblasts and the 
okrugs, and to establish new ones. Initially, there were 8 okrugs in the occupied 
region. By 1917, however, the number reached to 29: Rize, Atina, Humurgan, Melo, 
Karakilise, Bayezîd, Van, Tortum, Diyadin, Eleşkirt, Erzurum, Hasankale, Horasan, 
İd, Bergri, Aşkale, Mamahatun, Bayburt, Massad, Saray, İspir, Tercan, Verhnearaks 
(Upperaras), Hınıs, Dutah, Malazgirt, Erciş, Başkale, and Hoşab. In the cities, 
depending on the decision of the Military Governor-General, municipal police 
administration might be established. 
The posts of the Military Governor-General, his assistants, governors of the 
oblasts, their assistants, and the nachalniks of the okrugs would be entrusted 
exclusively to military officials, whereas for all other posts, military and civilian 
officials might be deputized.11 The responsibilities of the appointed officials were 
described briefly in the article 8 of Prikaz No.739. The main tasks would be “to 
reestablish and uphold law and order, to protect life, honor, property, religious-civil 
liberties of the inhabitants, to consider all nationalities equal before the Russian 
government, and to guarantee these inhabitants the possibility of free and tranquil 
                                                 
10 Kavkazskoe Slovo, 17 November 1917, p.4 
11 Prikaz No.739, p.2 
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labor, on the condition that they submit in toto to the suzerainty of Russia”12, and 
fulfill the obligations demanded by the Russian military and administrative 
authorities.13 At the same time, the officials should observe the proper evolution of 
civil and administrative life in the region, with the concern for the utilization of the 
facilities in the region in the interest of the army. The language of communication 
between Russian institutions and local institutions and personalities in the occupied 
regions would be Russian. However, under special conditions the governor-general 
might permit for simultaneous translation into local language. In order to establish 
the best system in the region, and to sustain the development of the prosperity of the 
native population, the Russian administration was obliged to elucidate and study the 
national, economic and social peculiarities comprehensively, and formulate all 
measures necessary to reach the stipulated aims.  
Other articles in the first section of Prikaz no. 739, were on the issues of tax, 
property and existing organizations. With Article 9; the functions of the existent 
social self-governance and charity organizations were guaranteed, though they were 
subject to the necessary changes or restrictions in their structure and activities by the 
Military Governor-General. According to the Article 11, all types of taxes and fees 
would be levied on the basis to be laid by the Military Governor-General with the 
confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army. In Article 12, it 
was stated that all the real estate belonging to the Turkish treasury would be regarded 
as the possession of the Russian treasury in accordance with the law of war booties. 
Although the property rights on real estates, which had been abandoned by the 
                                                 
12 Richard G. Hovannisian, “The Allies and Armenia 1915-1918”, Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol.3, no.1, (1968), 163-164 
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subjects of the adversary, would be preserved, these estates might be utilized for the 
need of the army or the treasury on orders of the Military Governor-General.14 
2.1.3 The Military Governor-General of the Occupied Regions of Turkey 
The rights and obligations of the Military Governor-General were described 
in Prikaz no 739. The Military Governor-General would be appointed by the order of 
the Emperor according to the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian 
Army. The Military Governor-General would submit to the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Caucasian army and perform as the highest organ of authority over the officials 
and institutions fulfilling the tasks listed above. All military and administrative 
institutions and military units were subordinate to the Military Governor-General 
except for those, which directly submitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Caucasian Army. Lieutenant General Nikolai Nikolayevich Peshkov was appointed 
as the first Military Governor-General of the occupied regions of Turkey. Later he 
was replaced by Lieutenant General Dryagin and the last military governor-general 
of the Russian imperial administration was the Major General Romanovskii-
Romanko.15 
The Military Governor-General enjoyed very broad set of powers under 
special wartime conditions. Legally, he was equated to the governor-generals of the 
Russian Empire. He had the power to arrest, bring to court and exile Russian subjects 
or the subjects of hostile governments, and to intervene in the process of the local 
judiciary system. The appointment and the dismissal of officials, the conduct of 
investigation in any place, the permission and banning of all social organizations and 
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educational institutions, the confiscation of mobile and immobile property, the 
suspension or the permission of publications in the Governor-Generalship and the 
allowance of the distribution of other publications from outside the region, were the 
other articles in the list stipulating the rights of the temporary Military Governor-
General.16  
2.1.4 The Military Governors of the Oblasts and the Nachalniks of the Okrugs 
and Uchastkas. 
Under the Military Governor-General functioned the military governors of 
the oblasts, who were chosen by the Commander-in-Chief among the candidates 
presented by the Military Governor-General, and were appointed by Imperial order. 
They would directly submit to the Military Governor-General and the nachalniks, in 
turn, would be subordinated to them. The military governors also had a broad range 
of powers, which allowed them to arrest and jail anyone endangering order, to 
conduct investigation anywhere, to prohibit or to allow all kinds of meetings, 
gatherings and conferences of the local organizations, to issue permits for the entry 
to and exit from their regions, to decide on the opening or closure of press, libraries, 
or reading rooms, to issue permissions to obtain and carry weapons as the chief of 
security organization of the oblasts. The supervision over the collection of taxes, 
fulfillment of public duties of the local population and activities of charity 
organizations were assigned to the military governors, who would brief the Military 
Governor-General about all the measures, implementations, orders and the 
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requirements to fulfill the assigned tasks, in a period of time to be determined by the 
Governor-General.17 
The subsequent post was the post of the nachalniks of the okrugs. They were 
appointed by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army on the 
proposal of the Military Governor-General and submitted to the military governors 
of the oblasts. The nachalniks were in direct contact with the local self-
administration units, and would regulate their functions, besides the fulfillment of all 
requirements of the army and the maintenance of order in the okrugs. They had the 
right to intervene in, to delay, to nullify or to confirm the results of the elections of 
the local administration bodies. These administrations were elected according to the 
ethnic structure of the okrug. For example, in Erzurum, the local administration 
consisted mainly of Muslims18 whereas in Trabzon the city administration consisted 
of Christians.19  
Prikaz No.739 stated that the nachalnik should travel in the okrug as much as 
possible, visit all social and administrative institutions, listen to and decide according 
the complaints of the population. As the head of the police system in the okrug, 
nachalniks may take every measure to ensure the preservation of order. The 
permissions for travel between the okrugs in an oblast, for any social activity 
including entertainment, were all issued by the nachalniks. The nachalniks might 
summon general conferences to solve problems concerning taxes, education, 
agriculture, postal services, and transportation routes, under his presidency with the 
                                                 
17 ibid., pp.8-10 
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participation of the members of the administrative institutions of the okrug and of the 
related personalities with only consultative vote. The nachalniks were responsible for 
the search and preservation of the official documents from the Ottoman period 
(defter, tapu and others). In accordance with Articles 12 and 13 of Prikaz No: 739, 
the nachalniks would sort out all mobile and immobile properties left by the Turkish 
administrative or military institutions and would take them under control, awaiting 
for corresponding orders from the military governors.20 
Appointment of the nachalniks of the okrugs took some time however urgent 
the business, and the nachalniks were appointed only at the beginning of 1917, and 
many of who were unable to assume their posts.21 
Name of the 
okrug 
Name of the nachalnik Name of the 
okrug 
Name of the nachalnik 
Rize Colonel Rosnovskii Homurgyan 
[Hamur] 
Colonel Progul’bitskii 
Melos [Milo] 
(Çoruh) 
Captain Matiyasevich Karakilise 
(Karaköse) 
Major (of Cossack regiment) 
Fisenko 
Atina (Pazar) Captain Gavilev Beyazıd   
Van Comissar-engineer 
Ambartsumyan 
Tortum Golokolosov 
Diyadin Ensign Boguslovskii Eleşkirt   
Erzurum Lieutenant-colonel Vasilev Hasankale Comissar Speranskii 
Horasan   Id [İd-
Narman] 
Major General Maklinskii 
Bergrii 
[Bergici] 
General-major Nadezhin Aşkale Major (of Cossack regiment) 
Golyakhovskii 
Mamahatun Lieutenant-colonel (of civil 
service) Djebenadze 
Bayburt Captain Lopukhin 
Massad 
[Masad] 
Colonel Flarenskii Saray 
[Mahmudiye] 
Colonel Kravets 
İspir   Tercan Colonel Aksenov 
UpperAras   Hınıs Colonel Aksenov 
Dutah   Erciş Captain Protopov 
                                                                                                                                          
19 “V Trapezund (Nasha Beseda),” Kavkazskoe Slovo, 25 June 1916, p.2; In November 1916, 2 
Muslim members were added to the city administration of Trabzon, upon the orders of the 
commander of the fortified region.“Khronika”, Trapezondskii Voyennii Listok, 8 November 1916, p.2 
20 Prikaz No: 739, pp.11-14 
21 Arutyunyan, ibid., pp. 359-360 
 20 
For the purpose of conciliation between the administrative authorities and the 
population, and for the convenience of management, the okrugs were divided into 
uchastkas, which were headed by the nachalniks of uchastkas. The number and the 
borders of the uchastkas were to be determined by the Military Governor-General on 
reports of military governors of the oblasts, who were in charge of the appointment 
of the nachalniks to uchastkas.22. These nachalniks, who would be subordinate to the 
nachalniks of the okrugs, were responsible for the maintenance of order in an 
uchastka, had the right to supervise over the activities and the elections of the elders 
of the village communities and administrations. Prikaz No.739 obliged the nachalnik 
of an uchastka to observe strictly the conformity of the election results with the 
ethnic structure of the villages. The rights and responsibilities of the nachalniks of 
uchastkas were restricted in the observation of the social and economic life and 
order, and in case of any violation of order, they had to inform the nachalniks of the 
okrugs.23  
The lowest level of administration consisted of village communities and rural 
districts. A village community was composed of all permanent residents or property 
owners registered in a village. A village community might be formed in one village 
or among a group of scantly populated adjacent villages. The rural districts were 
formed of communities of one or more densely populated villages. The 
administrative body of a village community included the village council, the village 
court, the village head and his deputies, the rural police (sotskie or desyatskie 
                                                 
22 Prikaz No.739 p.14 
23 ibid., p.15 
 21 
depending upon the amount of population) and a rural clerk.24 The village heads and 
deputies were elected in compliance with the ethnic composition of the villages.25 
Meanwhile in Petrograd, the popular unrest soon evolved into an outright 
revolution. On 28 February 1917, the High Command of the Russian Army, fearing a 
violent revolution, suggested that Nicholas II abdicate in favor of a more popular 
member of the royal family. Attempts were made to persuade Grand Duke Michael 
Aleksandrovich to accept the throne. Nevertheless, he refused and on March 1, 1917, 
the Tsar abdicated, leaving the Provisional Government in control of the country. 
This radical change in the governance of the country could not help but critically 
affect the structure of the administration in the occupied territories. 
The Provisional Government abolished the Military Governor-Generalship of 
the occupied regions of Turkey alongside with the other governors-generalship of the 
Empire, except that of Finland.26 In a telegram dated May 1, 1917, Knyaz L’vov (the 
chairman of the Provisional Government) stated that, the civil administration of the 
occupied regions of Turkey was separated from the administration of the Caucasian 
districts and from the military administration of the Caucasian Front and would 
directly submit to the Provisional Government. The authority and powers of the 
Military Governor-General of the occupied areas of Turkey defined in Prikaz no.739 
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were transferred to ‘the General Commissar of the Turkish Armenia’ appointed by 
the Provisional Government.27 
In accordance with the new body of political surveillance, the commissariats, 
after the last military Governor-General of the occupied regions of Turkey, 
Romanovskii-Romanko, Ivanitskii functioned between May 2 and May 25, as the 
“Commissar of the Provisional Government for the Military Administration of The 
Regions of Turkey, occupied under law of and from May 25, A. P. Averyanov used 
the title of the “General-Commissar of Turkish Armenia and similar regions of 
Turkey occupied under law of war. The titles of the lower posts were also changed 
and the heads of the oblasts okrugs and uchastkas were entitled as the commissars of 
their respective units.28  
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2.1.5 The judicial and police system 
The structure of the judicial system of the occupied Turkish territories and the 
sphere of activities of its various parts were also determined by Prikaz no.739 The 
Military Governor-General and the heads of the oblasts and okrugs started to 
implement the articles of Prikaz No.739, as they assumed their posts. For example, 
on 29 January 1917, the nachalnik of the fortified region of Trabzon ratified ‘The 
provisions on the judicial system in the fortified region of Trabzon’ based on the 
related articles of Prikaz no.739. On 17 February, the inhabitants of the city were 
called to elect the heads of the courts and the judges, and on the next day, the main 
building of the Trabzon court was opened. The three-level system of public courts, 
that is the rural public courts (sel’skii narodniy sud), public courts of the districts 
(okrujniy narodniy sud), and the general public court (generalniy narodniy sud), 
structured by Prikaz No.739, was put into practice.29  
The rural public courts formed the first level in the structure of the judicial 
system. The second level was the public court of the districts and the third was the 
general public court in the capital cities of the oblasts. Rural public courts consisted 
of rural judges and of a kadı, elected by the judges, for the settlement of cases 
according to the shari’a. The public courts of the districts, being the courts of appeal 
for several civil and criminal cases settled unfinished by the rural courts would 
conclude these cases. At the same time, these courts would act as the courts of 
origination for the serious cases, which were out of the competence of the rural 
public courts. A public court of district would function under the presidency of an 
assistant of the nachalnik of an okrug, and was composed of deputies, delegates, a 
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kadı (for cases related to the shari’a), and a secretary. General public courts would be 
the courts of appeal for cases considered at public courts of the districts, and the 
court of origination for more serious cases. The general public courts would operate 
under the presidency of the military governor of the oblasts or his assistant, and 
consisted of the delegates, the kadı, and a secretary. The decisions and the sentences 
of the general public courts could not be appealed or protested. All the civil and 
criminal cases considered at the public courts would be settled according to local 
traditional law unless the local traditional law proved to be competent. Otherwise the 
decisions and sentences would be based on the corresponding articles of the Russian 
law. All cases relating to marriage, heritage and other conflicts between spouses, 
parents and children of Muslim origin, would be settled according to the shari’a by 
public courts.30  
An effective judicial system necessitated the establishment of an internal 
security system for the occupied regions. According to Prikaz No.739, the military 
governors of the oblasts and the nachalniks of the okrugs were defined as the highest 
police authority in their respective localities. For the reinforcement of the staff of the 
police system, the Viceroy at the Caucasus appealed to the Minister of Internal 
Affairs in April 1916, before the Tsar approved Prikaz no.739. On his request, the 
Minister of Internal Affairs provided a detachment of 300 policemen, (who were in 
charge in the occupied regions of Galicia, and then were under the command of the 
army in the result of the Russian withdrawal from the region in 1915), to the 
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occupied regions.31 This number was insufficient for the requirements of the 
conditions in the occupied territories, so that, the newly appointed Military 
Governor-General of the occupied regions of Turkey, Lieutenant-General N.N. 
Peshkov, asked the dispatch of 5000 policemen from the Ministry the Internal 
Affairs.32 The request of the Military Governor-General could not be carried out due 
to aggravating social unrest in Russia proper, and due to the lack of sufficient 
number of policemen.33 In November 1916, the Viceroy at the Caucasus applied to 
the Council of Ministers (Sovet Ministrov) with the request of the dispatch of at least 
2000 policemen to the occupied regions of Turkey.34 Following the correspondence 
between Minister of the Internal Affairs and Prime Minister Aleksandr Fyodorovich 
Trepov in December 1916, it was apparent that the demand of the Viceroy was also 
turned down.35 Although the number of security personnel rose to 3000 in August 
1917, the Commissar General of Turkish Armenia and other regions of Turkey, 
Major-General A. P. Averyanov, was complaining about the lack of the necessary 
number of policemen to maintain order in the region of his responsibility.36 
2.1.6 Institutionalization of the financial system in occupied regions 
Economic life in occupied territories had flourished during the establishment 
of the new administrative system, and with the return of a significant amount of 
population to the. During the ensuing months of the occupation, many stores of the 
local population and new ones founded by Russian subjects were opened in city 
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centers.37 However, since the region was isolated from Turkey due to war and from 
Russia, because of the problems of transportation, there was a severe lack of 
necessary goods in the cities. Prices of goods that were found were three-four fold of 
the prices in Russia.38 The immense number of the refugees exasperated the 
situation. Adding to all, the existing customs system presented an insurmountable 
obstacle for the importation of commodity from Russia. According to wartime 
prohibitions, exportation of many goods was forbidden to the land of adversary 
states.39 Since the region was not defined as an integral part of the Russian Empire, 
but as an occupied region of the adversary by law of war, the definition of the current 
legal status was quite complicated. 
Secondly, a reliable customs control on the transfer of commodities was 
impossible because of the absence of customs security on the border between 
Russian territory and the occupied regions, and also between the occupied regions 
and the Turkish territory. The destination of exports could not be determined, as to 
whether they were destined to the occupied territories or to Turkish territories. In that 
case, the Ministry of Finance proposed that exportation to the occupied territories 
should be defined as exportation to a foreign country, and should be subject to 
permission in each separate case. 
The permission procedures were taking so much time however urgent the 
business, and were badly affecting the goods, especially foodstuffs, and worsening 
the conditions of life for the civilian population and also for the Russian military 
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units.40 Then, the military authorities tried to alleviate the situation by sending goods 
from Russian ports, such as Odessa and Batum, which were the main supply points. 
However, the legal situation of the Trabzon port set an obstacle for exports. The 
military authorities recognized Trabzon as a part of the Russian Empire, whereas the 
customs department of the Ministry of Finance announced it as a foreign port. Under 
pressure from the military authorities, the Department of Customs Duty of the 
Ministry of Finance gave its consent for duty free transport of commodities for the 
population and the soldiers on the basis that the provisions sent by military 
authorities should be allowed without objection under the war conditions. However, 
the Department of Customs Duty reinstated that, in other cases the port of Trabzon 
would be recognized as a foreign port.41 Following this resolution many traders 
applied to the customs offices and got permission to carry food provisions for the 
starving population of Asia Minor under Russian occupation.42  
The final resolution of the Department of Customs Duty was explained in the 
Circular No.435, which was disseminated on 24 June 1916 to all customs offices on 
the Black Sea and the Azov coasts and on the previous state borders with Turkey. It 
was stated that the exportation of prohibited goods necessitated special permission, 
all other commodities would be exported according to the present regulations and the 
exported goods could only be distributed in the occupied territories. The authorities 
to issue the permission were the military authorities, the governorship of the place of 
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origination and the representative of the Special Council on the Matters of Provision 
(Osoboe soveshchanie po prodovol’stvennomu delu).43  
The regulations of the circular could not help but complicate the problem in 
the face of the prevalent conditions. On 5 July 1916, Batum customs office 
petitioned the Department of Customs Duty, claiming that the condition of special 
permission for each case of exportation could not be applied in the face of a very 
dense and varied traffic of transportation, in which many military and private ships 
and small naval vehicles of the local population took part.44 Had the procedures of 
permission been applied, they would create problems and complaints. On 11 July, 
the Batum office of the All Russian Union of Towns45 appealed to the Department of 
Customs Duty complaining about the impediments stemming from the regulations 
and applications of the Batum customs office.46  
Revising the petitions of the Batum customs office, the Batum office of the 
All-Russian Union of Towns and private traders, the Department of Customs Duty 
decided to consult the Chancellery of the Viceroy on the fulfillment of the 
establishment of a new order for the transportation of goods. The Department 
informed the Chancellery about their decision to give permission for the exportation 
of all goods under the responsibility of the military authorities till the ultimate 
installation of a customs system.47 The Chancellery of the Viceroyalty in response, 
declared its approval of the procedures defined in Circular No.435. However, the 
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Ministry of Finance amended the procedures and informed the Caucasian Tax 
Inspector that, the right of giving permission for the exported goods belongs to the 
General Chief of Supply of the Caucasian Army in agreement with the 
Representative of the Special Council on Matters of Provision in the Caucasus.48 
Thus, the long procedures required for permission were reduced to a significant 
extent. 
Another side of the problem was related with the imported goods from the 
occupied regions. The then present customs regulations forbade all imports from 
adversary states. On June 13 1916, the Ministry of Finance informed the Ministry of 
Industry about the rules concerning the importation of goods from the newly 
conquered Turkish ports. The regulations would be parallel to those applied in the 
transportation of goods from the occupied Austro-Hungarian territories. The Viceroy 
at the Caucasus gave his consent for the application of these rules, which defined 
imports from the occupied territories as Turkish commodity due to taxation.49 
After the establishment of the administration of the occupied regions the 
matter was set forth again. The Military Governor-General N. N. Peshkov 
complained to the Viceroy about the taxation of imports. According to Peshkov, the 
people of Lazistan were in need of governmental support for survival although they 
had great stocks of nuts and oranges. Had the tariffs on their products were annulled 
they might provide for their living. Besides this economic necessity, the taxation of 
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the commodities originating from the occupied territories was impractical for the 
only customs office in the region was in Batum.50  
Depending on the report of the Military Governor-General of the occupied 
regions of Turkey and on the permission of the Viceroy,51 the Ministry of Finance 
declared in a resolution on 25 December that, the goods from the occupied territories 
of Turkey would be exempted from taxes and tariffs exclusively at the customs 
offices of the Caucasian theater of war. In case that the goods were transported 
through other customs offices of the Russian Empire, they would be subject to 
previous taxes and tariffs.52  
2.1.7 The system of taxation 
The procedures for export and import were thus temporarily formulated to be 
in effect till the official annexation of the region. The regulations largely depended 
on the imminent wartime necessities and reflected the controversial approaches of 
the military and governmental authorities. Another financial institutionalization in 
the occupied Turkish territories was the installation of the taxation system, the 
structure of which was also defined in Prikaz No.739.53  
Under the Military Governor-Generalship, the Temporary Administration of 
Taxation was established for the management of the state and territorial taxes and 
duties. A representative of the Ministry of Finance would be in charge of the 
Administration in accordance with the approval of the Military Governor-General 
and was to be appointed by an Imperial decree. The head of the department was 
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empowered to observe the regular collection of state and local taxes, and revenues 
from the municipalities; to conduct bookkeeping and reporting on the state and local 
taxes, and to collect statistical information on the matters related to the subjects 
under the management of the administration. The taxes to be collected from the local 
population would be the taxes determined by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Caucasian Army and the taxes of the Ottoman period, which were reinstated by the 
confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief or the Military Governor-General. 
The Administration of Taxation would employ financial inspectors in the 
districts, who were assigned to register trade and industrial institutions, to observe 
regular collection of all taxes, to keep the accounts of the capital holdings and the 
activities of tax collection of the municipal administrations, to study the economic 
aspects of the districts. The head of the tax administration, his assistants and the 
financial inspectors in the districts had the power to inspect all trade and industrial 
institutions.  
The Ministry of Finance contemplated to gather a special commission for the 
preparation of the taxation system for the occupied regions and decided to appoint 
Protasyev as the head of the temporary taxation administration. However, when the 
Minister of Finance, Petr L'vovich Bark informed the Military Governor-General N. 
N Peshkov, on 25 July 1916, about the appointment of Protasyev, who was 
acquainted with the peculiarities of the Caucasian region as the representative of the 
ministry, the Military Governor-General did not acquiesce. Moreover, according to a 
ciphered report of Protasyev, 54 the Chancellery of the Viceroyalty did not approve 
the establishment of a special commission, sharing the suspicion of the Military 
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Governor-General, that an independent commission would undermine the authority 
of the Military Governor-Generalship. The Viceroyalty and the Military Governor-
General preferred to delay the matter till the end of the war. Although the Minister of 
Finance shared the ideas of Protasyev, he informed the latter that it was inevitable to 
comply with the will of the Military Governor-General in wartime conditions.55 
2.2 Colonization Projects and the Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the 
Occupied Regions. 
2.2.1 Colonization Projects 
Even before the establishment of the Russian administration of the occupied 
regions, colonization and exploitation of the lands in these regions were discussed 
and planned by the Russian state departments. Depending on the immediate food 
requirements of the marching army temporary precautions were taken, and with the 
establishment of the administrative system, the Military Governor-Generalship 
engaged in the colonization and exploitation activities, which were already 
commenced. 
One of the first political figures interested in the future of the occupied 
regions was the Minister of Agriculture (Zemledelie). In 1915 and 1916 he wrote to 
the Foreign Minister about the plans of the Ministry of Agriculture on the 
exploitation of the occupied regions of Turkey and Iran in a letter dated 13 March 
1915. He divided the whole region into four zones, two in Turkey and two in Iran 
(only the Turkish zones are cited here): 
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Black Sea Coast: The region from Batum to Trabzon seemed 
to be the prolongation of the Batum Riviera but with a milder climate. 
Orange, lemon, tobacco, and nuts are produced, [it is] rich in forests, 
especially suitable for summer resorts, resting areas and tea 
plantation. 
Headwaters of Aras and Euphrates: this region consisted of 
the Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis vilayets. The mountainous region was 
rich in mineral resources and suitable for the settlement of Russian 
colonizers. The important part of the region seemed to be the 
headwaters of Aras for this region comprised the main supply of 
water for the Eastern Caucasus.56 
On 25 March 1916 the Minister of Agriculture again addressed to the Foreign 
Minister with the request to urgently commence the studies on the questions 
connected to the exploitation of the occupied areas. According to the Minister of 
Agriculture, it became urgent to discuss “the actual agricultural problems in the 
occupied regions of Turkish Armenia”, after the occupation of Erzurum and Bitlis 
vilayets by the Caucasian Army. In order to facilitate the solution of the problem, the 
minister offered the help of his ministerial staff about the necessary acts for the 
exploitation of the acquired fields in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry.57  
In his telegram on 19 March 1916, the Minister of Agriculture addressed the 
Viceroy of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, and proposed the 
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appointment of an experienced officer from the Colonization Department for the 
purpose of the ultimate incorporation of conquered territories. His nominee for the 
investigation of colonization in the region was the deputy for the Chief of the Central 
Administration of Colonization, Kamer-junker A. A. Tatishchev, who “successfully 
organized the colonization programs in the Far East and Turkestan”.58 
In the same telegraph, the Minister of Agriculture warned the Viceroy of the 
immediate danger of speculative acquisitions of land and pointed that after a fair 
distribution of land to the native population, there would still be a significant amount 
of territory appropriate for the settlement of the Russian colonizers, especially of the 
participants of the current war. On 23 March 1916, the Viceroy replied to the 
Minister of Agriculture that he outlawed all illegal acquisitions of land in occupied 
regions and had no objections to the suggested name for the research aimed at 
colonization programs, which he found suitable in a time when he had already 
planned the prospective regulations for the civil administration of occupied regions.59 
The Chief of the Colonization Department, Gennadii Feodorovich Chirkin 
also gave his consent for the nomination of A. A. Tatishchev with a minor 
reservation. He advised that Tatishchev should be sent as a representative of the 
Russian Red Cross instead of as an official from the Colonization Department in 
order not to invoke any disturbance among the native population.60  
Thus, A. A. Tatishchev was appointed with the task of investigating the 
conditions of colonization in conquered regions of Turkey. He prepared a program 
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for the investigation in which professor Vasilii Vasil’evich Sapozhnikov61 would 
organize a three month survey, which would be supported by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and would be realized under the permission of Military Governor-
General Peshkov, in the region encompassing “Sarıkamış, Köprüköy, Erzurum, 
Hınıs, Malazgirt, Muş, Eleşkirt, Bayezid, Van, and if possible, the coastal region of 
the Black Sea.” It was aimed with this expedition to prepare minor scale military-
topographic maps of the region instead of the major scale Turkish maps62, to indicate 
the arable and pasture lands and meadows on these maps, to clarify the names and 
ethnic structure of the villages, number of houses and land per house in those 
villages depending on the researches and on the testimony of the native population, 
to investigate the system of land tenure, conditions of the irrigation and productivity 
of the soil through interviews with the local population.63 
Before the realization of this program, Tatishchev conducted an 
expeditionary trip and on 22 May 1916, sent a report to the Viceroy, summarizing 
the results of his own trip in occupied territories.64 Dividing the region into two 
separate parts as vilayets of Turkish Armenia and Kurdistan, and Lazistan, 
Tatishchev underscored the necessity of the prevention of illegal acquisition of free-
lands, which had belonged to the native population before the war, and to which 
Russian settlers might be directed. He proposed the authorization of several officials 
experienced in agriculture to determine and figure out the arable and pasture lands, 
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and meadows, and their percentages. According to Tatishchev, before the inception 
of the Russian settlement, the older legal system of land tenure should be clarified, 
although he envisaged that the prospective Russian application of the system of land 
distribution should be different from the previous Ottoman one. 
Further, Tatishchev emphasized the possibility of appropriation of Kurdish 
lands, since the Kurds behaved inimically against the Russian Army. The Armenian 
landownership was also subject to alterations due to the fact that significant amount 
of the Armenian population had suffered during the war, either had fled, been 
deported from the region or been killed. Therefore, the land that had belonged to 
them was exposed to the future arrangements of the Russian state. Another aspect of 
the problem was the settlement of the Russian population among the natives. Since 
this might arise friction among respective groups, Tatishchev suggested the 
establishment of a new system in which different groups would be settled separately. 
Adding to all, many refugees did not possess legal documents of ownership, so it 
was not possible to allocate land according to legal documents. The only way to 
solve the problem favorably for the Russian settlers and the native population was to 
delimitate allocations into economically meaningful borders and into amounts 
satisfactory for the requirements of the population.  
For Tatishchev Prikaz No.121 of the Caucasian Viceroyalty, which gave the 
right to rent the land without right to ownership, was an appropriate one in view of 
the resettlement of the refugees. Since the majority of those refugees could not 
declare documents of landownership, in order not to complicate the food and fodder 
supply problem of the army, the land should be rented according to Prikaz No.121. 
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He pointed out that, the social and governmental philanthropic organizations should 
interview the refugees about their places of original residence, and the police should 
provide them with documents indicating those places, in order to facilitate the 
resettlement. 
According to Tatishchev the problems of agriculture in Lazistan were 
different. Since the people from the eastern part of the region had fled or had been 
annihilated, the land was free. However, in the western region, starting from Rize, 
people had remained in their places and it was hard to find free land. Moreover, most 
of the population, according to the nachalnik of Rize, possessed legal documents. In 
this part of the region, land allocation might be based on those documents, but in the 
eastern part a special official from the Ministry of Agriculture should be authorized 
for clarification of the problem. 
As Tatishchev mentioned in his report, upon the authorization of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, N. A. Lenskii from the University of Petrograd, prepared a special 
study on the legal status of land ownership in Turkish Armenia.65 Lenskii defined the 
historical process of the formation and the legal foundations of the Ottoman practice 
for the land allocation and tenure before he briefly explained the categories of land in 
the Empire.66 Concerning the Eastern parts of the Empire, which were then under 
Russian occupation, Lenskii stressed the semi-feudal status of these regions, in 
which, Kurdish agas were oppressing Armenian villagers, a firm rule of law over 
landownership was nonexistent, and the attitude of the Ottoman officials against the 
non-Muslim villagers and the landowners were arbitrary and negative. In the light of 
                                                 
65 N. A. Lenskii, O pravovom polojenii zemlevladeniya v Turetskoi Armenii, (Petrograd: N.p., 1916) 
66 ibid., pp.3-12  
 38 
all, he described the situation as a “judicial chaos in which legal documents were 
either non-existent or counterfeit, so it was nearly impossible to find out the real 
owners of the lands.”67  
Lenskii came to a conclusion that, for the sake of the practical policy, the 
only way for the solution would be to ignore the previous Ottoman practice of 
regulations on land, at least as far as the country rural landownership was concerned. 
In case that the conquered territory would be incorporated into the Russian Empire, 
Russian authorities should not be obliged to preserve the previous rights of the 
population on land for such legal rights were nearly nonexistent.68 Following the 
prospective Russian allocation of land there would be free Armenian lands, which 
should be enlisted into the State Fund of Lands, not into the properties of the 
Armenian Church, since the Russian armies fought for the survival of the Armenians 
and not for the establishment of an Armenian territory. Nevertheless, the Armenian 
population would gain the long-awaited peaceful conditions by the firm recognition 
of the property rights of the population and with the termination of the dependency 
on the will of the feudal agas.69  
The report of Tatishchev to the Viceroy was discussed at a special meeting, 
which convened on 30 May 1916, in Tiflis.70 In the meeting, which was headed by 
the assistant of the Viceroy on civilian matters Lieutenant General Knyaz B. N. 
Orlov, Lieutenant General N. N. Peshkov (later the Military Governor-General of the 
occupied regions), the Chief of the Field Staff of the Caucasian Army Major General 
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Bolhovitonov, and the chief of the refugees management, Major General V. M. 
Tamamshev took part. 
The participants of the meeting consented for the appointment of a special 
official from the Ministry of Agriculture to Lazistan, and on the extension of the 
implementation of Prikaz no.121, and decided to publish it in an appeal to the 
population in Armenian and Turkish. The project of a detailed survey to clarify all 
agricultural problems of the region was found immature and impracticable in the 
chaotic conditions of the ongoing war. Nevertheless, it was decided to organize a 
general survey, which might serve as a starting point for detailed explorations for the 
future to be conducted after military-administrative authority was firmly established. 
Upon the resolutions of the Tiflis meeting, a general survey instead of the 
detailed expedition proposed by Tatishchev was conducted under Professor 
Sapozhnikov with the participation of the botanist Shishkin and geologist S. I. 
Turemnov. The survey started at the end in July 1916, and continued till August.71 
The scientists mainly studied the climatic and soil conditions of the region and the 
character of the population. In the report of the survey, the settlement of a significant 
amount of Russian colonizers was suggested in order both to utilize the wealth of the 
region intensively, and to introduce the conciliatory influence of the Russian 
peasants in the cruel friction between the Armenian and Kurdish population of the 
region.72  
Another decision of the Tiflis meeting for the appointment of a special 
official of the Ministry of Agriculture with a mission for the exploration on the 
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territory of Lazistan, was carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture and on 13 
October 1916, the Military Governor-General of the occupied territories, was 
informed about the appointment of the agronomist P. P. Nikolenko, and the 
representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in the Caucasus, K. I. Shashkovskii, 
asked the Military Governor-General for cooperation and assistance from the local 
administrations.73  
However, the response of the Military Governor-General was not in line with 
the expectations of the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture. In the present 
conditions, Lieutenant General Peshkov found a study aimed at the identification of 
“free-lands” premature and early. First, he asserted that it was not clear yet which 
kind of land would be defined as “free”; second, since the administrative 
organization was not completed in the region, the security and assistance for 
transportation of the researchers could not be granted. Furthermore, Peshkov 
emphasized that the officials of the ministry could only work according to the 
programs prepared by the Military Governor-General, and in those places where the 
Military Governor-General allowed them. Peshkov added that the problem of “free 
lands” could not be solved earlier than 2-3 years, at least a few months after the 
signature of the peace treaty. According to Peshkov, even the preliminary studies 
with the purpose of the clarification of the “free-lands problem” were arousing unrest 
among the population, especially among the Armenians. Thus, the Military 
Governor-General proposed that, P. P. Nikolenko, who was at that time in Tiflis, 
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should not commence his studies and should be under the disposal of the Governor-
General.74. 
The Ministry of Agriculture did not reject the proposal of the Governor-
General, however, Tatishchev requested from Nikolenko a number of tasks to be 
fulfilled besides the works assigned by Military Governor-General. Tatishchev 
demanded from Nikolenko to discover the scale of the land usage by the native 
population before the war, and variation of land ownership of different families, 
local peculiarities of the land reserve, relations between villagers and landowners, 
rights of the Armenian monasteries, relations between the Kurds and the Armenians, 
opinion of the population about the future economic structure after the incorporation 
of the territory to the [Russian] Empire, the preferred type of local agriculture and 
the quantity of the land, necessary for a family of a Russian farmer, depending on the 
local conditions.75 
From an interview with the Military Governor-General, published on 24 
November 1916 in Novoe Vremya, we might deduce that the Military Governor-
General was preserving his reservation about the early settlement projects, even 
about the return of the refugees. He declares that all should wait till the end of war 
and till the accomplishment of the administrative organization. Military Governor-
General’s words also inform us that the Tatishchev report and the resolutions of the 
Tiflis meeting were implemented to a certain extent, i.e. the list of the Armenian and 
non-Armenian villages were being prepared, and charity and relief organizations 
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were instructed to interview the refugees about their places of original residence.76 
Besides in the fortified region of Trabzon, a statistical survey on the ethnic structure, 
land tenure and livestocks of the villages was conducted and published by the acting 
nachalnik of Trabzon, S. R. Mintslov.77 
The colonization efforts were also discussed at the State Duma, and were 
reflected in the newspapers of Petrograd, and Tiflis.78 According to the Rech’, the 
main cadres of the future settlement would be the unarmed worker druzhins79 
consisting of 1000 workers, which started to be formed in the autumn of 1915. No 
Armenians or Georgians were admitted to the druzhins, the main tasks of which were 
to prepare the allocation of land, and to produce food and fodder for the Caucasian 
Army and worked under agricultural specialists. Rech’ referred to two projects for 
the settlement of Russian colonizers in the occupied regions. The first one featured 
the dispatch of the druzhin families, whereas the second proposed the settlement of 
Cossacks from the Northern Caucasus. Kavkazskoe Slovo interpreted these, as 
projects for the establishment of a buffer zone of Russians between the Turkish and 
Russian Armenian regions.80 The first issue of Kavkazskoe Khozyaystvo, the 
publication of the Imperial Caucasian Society of Agriculture, contained an article on 
the agricultural prospective of the Pasinler and Erzurum valleys.81 
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2.2.2 The Exploration and the Exploitation of the Natural Resources and the 
Construction of Railroads and Ports 
As early as December 1914, the Ministry of Trade and Industry appointed a 
geologist engineer to the General Staff of the Caucasian Army in order to conduct 
research on the natural resources of the region of military operations. The engineer 
dealt with research and mining of the coal reserves at the village of Kükürtlü (near 
Aşkale). Since the reserves proved beneficial, a special brigade of workers of 40 men 
were sent in August 1916, and afterwards 1200 more men were transferred from 
Alexandropol on the orders of the Chief of the Supply Management of the Caucasian 
Army. Notwithstanding the stimulating results, the work was not continued in the 
following months after the mine was left under the control of the Military Governor-
Generalship. The output decreased drastically, and the Military Governor-
Generalship could not manage the transportation of the extracted coal.82 In the 
Erzurum region, throughout the years 1916-1917, explorations for other coalmines 
were conducted, and in the Erzurum, Mamahatun, and Hasankale districts salt 
reserves were exploited.83 
In the first months of 1916, with the initiatives of the Director of the 
Engineering Works 10 engineer druzhins explored oil in the region of the villages of 
Kontranlı, Hüseyin Ağa, and Madrah, and reached at 7 sazhen84 light oil reserves of 
20 poods a day.85 However, according to the strategic decisions of the 
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administration, the druzhins were dispatched to another region and work was 
ceased.86 
Another exploration for oil was conducted in the Hınıs region. In February 
1917, the engineer of the corps in that region, applied to the engineering department 
of the Zemgor.87 The staff, which had discovered the oil reserves in the HüseyinAğa 
and Madrah region, worked in Hınıs and found substantial reserves. However, the 
facilities of the corps did not suffice to accomplish the research and the exploitation 
of the reserves, so the results were reported to the Military Governor-Generalship. 
Although the Military Governor-General Romanovskii-Romanko gave instructions 
for immediate continuation of the research and exploitation efforts, the 
reorganization of the Military Governor-Generalship after the February revolution 
impeded efforts.88 
In spite of the fact that the occupied regions were rich in natural reserves, the 
ambiguity in the status of ownership and the transportation problems hindered the 
exploitation of these resources. The transportation problem proved a critical obstacle 
also for the supply of the army. Hence, the Russian administrations of the region 
before and after the establishment of the Military Governor-Generalship, dealt with 
the construction of roads in the region. The existing chaussees and roads were 
enlarged and repaired89, and many new roads were built. The main road until the 
occupation was the Erzurum-Trabzon road, which had been built by a French 
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corporation, connecting Köprüköy, Hasankale, Erzurum and turning from Aşkale 
towards Bayburt and ending at Trabzon. Utilizing this chaussee, the Russian 
administration constructed Iğdır-Taşlıçay-Karakilise-Zeydekyan-Meçitli, 
Zeydekyan-Köprüköy-Meçitli, Meçitli-Hınıskale-Sevaki, Karakilise-Malazgirt-
Ahlat, Oltu-Tortum-Bayburt network and a road connecting Van to this network.90 In 
the capital cities such as Trabzon and Gümüşhane broader roads (which are still in 
use) were constructed and in the construction of these local population were 
employed.91  
For the construction of railways, separate administrations were founded. The 
Administration for the Construction of the Military Railroad of Erzurum92, 
completed the construction of Sarıkamış-Erzurum narrow gauge railway of 165 km, 
and the 25 km of the route from Erzurum to Mamahatun until September 1917. The 
alteration of the narrow gauge with a wide gauge was approved by the chief of 
supply management of the Caucasian army, General of infantry, N.N Yanushkevich, 
at the meeting of the Caucasian Department of the Russian Geographical Society.93 
The project included the constructions of the Erzurum-Başköy and Köprüköy-
Hınıskale-Sevaki branch lines, but the projects were not fulfilled due to the 
withdrawal of the Russian Army in 1918. Another railway constructed in Eastern 
Anatolia was the Şahtahtı-Karakilise railroad connecting the valley of Ararat to the 
valley of Eleşkirt. From this line, the Beyazıt-Arnis (Arın) (160 km) (on lake Van) 
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branch line was built and was extended till Sofalı (40 km.) however the branch line 
of Karakilise-Malazgirt-Ahlat could not be accomplished.94  
In the fortified region of Trabzon, the Administration for the Construction of 
Military Railways of the Trabzon Region95 completed the construction of the 
Trabzon-Gümüşhane line of 150 km, which was planned to pass through Erzincan 
and to connect with the Erzurum narrow gauge in the Mamahatun region.96 The main 
line of Batum-Trabzon was projected for the connection of the Black Sea coasts with 
the Russian Empire, and a separate administration for the construction works was 
established. The turbulent year 1917 also hindered the construction of this railway. A 
special inspector from Special Transcaucasian Committee (OZAKOM) was 
appointed to liquidate the Administration of the Batum-Trabzon railway and to 
distribute materials and labor among the construction administrations of Black Sea 
railway, military railroads of the Trabzon region and the coastal highway of Batum-
Trabzon.97 
The Turkish forces, advancing after the Erzincan Truce of December 1917, 
acquired an enormous number of rolling stock, but could not operate them, due to the 
lack of personnel and materials.98 Other than the railways, the Russian administration 
improved the water route facilities. Since the Black Sea coasts were not connected 
by land route to the empire, starting from the very first day of the occupation, the 
construction of ports at the Black Sea coasts had commenced. Initially simple docks 
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were built in Trabzon, Rize and Polathane (Akçaabat) in 1916, and were improved 
throughout the occupation.99 In addition to such activities on the Black Sea littoral, 
the transportation possibilities across Lake Van were also utilized and the coastal 
towns of Arnis (Arın), Van, Ahlat and Tatvan were equipped with docks.100 
Concluding Remarks 
Following the first news of victory at the Caucasian Front against the Turkish 
armies, the Russian Government and the Russian High Command projected a series 
of measures for the organization of the administrative and economic life in the 
conquered areas. The Rules for the temporary Russian administration entailed the 
preservation of the previous territorial delimitations while appointing Russian 
military officials as the highest authorities. Yet municipal and rural administrations 
remained solidly native. There were hardly any attempts at cultural assimilation, the 
Russian administration did not ban the local languages, and the Shari’a courts 
continued to exist. Nevertheless, projects for the settlement of the Russian population 
as the mainstay of Russian domination were contemplated. This semi-autonomous 
form of control, respecting the geographic, ethnic, and cultural peculiarities, was the 
dominant pattern of the Russian colonial rule. 
The first measures were taken in order to reestablish order and security of the 
population, to guarantee the security of the rear of the army, to mobilize the 
economic resources of the region in line with the interests of the army. Since all the 
political, economic and administrative regulations in the occupied regions were first 
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of all implemented in the interests of the war conduct, the conflicts between the 
civilian and military authorities were settled to the benefit of the military authorities.  
The legal status of the occupied regions remained a problem between the 
Russian civilian and military authorities throughout the occupation. The military 
authorities intended to recognize the region as an annexed part of the Russian 
Empire, whereas the governmental departments insisted on the status of “the 
occupied territories by law of war”. A declaration by the Military Commander of the 
Fortified Region of Trabzon, Major General Schwartz, about the equality of the 
people before Russian law in a Russian territory referring to the occupied regions 
invoked a diplomatic conflict between the Foreign Ministry and the military 
administration of Trabzon.101 
Whatever the legal status of the occupied regions was, many projects were 
started to be implemented for the establishment of a Russian administration; i.e., the 
colonization and exploitation of the resources of the region, and construction of 
transportation routes. On the one hand, the establishment of the administration, 
which was carried out by the Military Governor-Generalship of the occupied regions, 
progressed sluggishly and the delay in the appointment of the nachalniks of the 
okrugs and the uchastkas, deteriorated the conditions of life in the occupied regions. 
102 On the other hand, the projects for colonization, and construction, could not be 
accomplished due to ineffective bureaucracy, unfavorable war conditions and most 
of all due to the detrimental effects of the 1917 Russian revolutions on all parts of 
the Russian Empire. 
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102 ibid., p.94 
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3. CHAPTER 3: THE HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS 
3.1. Supply and Medical Assistance Problems of the Army and Society 
While the administration of the occupied regions was being formed according 
to Prikaz no.739 dated 18 June 1916, some parts of the region had been for more 
than a year under the Russian occupation The military units in the region handled the 
maintenance of order in the region, until the Military Governor-Generalship initiated 
the establishment of the central system for the occupied territories after 18 June 
1916. However, during this time, the population of the region and the refugees 
returning from different places were totally devastated due to the conditions of war 
and were in need of every kind of help. The military authorities at the Caucasian 
Front were not able to meet the requirements of the devastated population. Even the 
army itself was facing difficulties of supply in the form of medico-sanitary aid and 
nourishment due to the peculiar transportation problems of the Caucasian Front and 
due to the general inadequacies to which the Russian Army was exposed. 
The World War came out to be more devastating and longer than expected for 
all belligerents as well as for the Russian Empire. One of the main inadequacies of 
the Russian Army was related to the care of the casualties. The War Ministry was in 
charge of the evacuation and healing of the wounded and sick soldiers according to 
prewar plans. Adding to the prospective measures of the ministry, the Russian Red 
Cross (RRC) would assist in the organization and equipment of the hospitals.1 
However, with the outbreak of the war it became apparent that the plans were not 
                                                 
1 A. B. Astashov, “Soyuzy Zemstv i Gorodov i Pomosh’ Ranennym v Pervuyu Mirovuyu Voinu”, 
Otechestvennaya Istoriya, no.6, (1992), p.170 
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efficient. The number of the casualties was much higher than expected, and the 
facilities of the War Ministry and the RRC were insufficient.2 
The insufficiency of the War Ministry and the RRC to undertake the medico-
sanitary assistance to the army urged not only the General Staff (Stavka), but also the 
leaders of the society to look for remedies for the situation. “In July 1914, Duma 
members established a Provisional Committee for the Relief of Wounded and Sick 
Soldiers (under the leadership of [the chairman of the Duma] M. V. Rodzianko).”3 
With patriotic motives and with similar objectives, the urban and rural councils 
founded the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos and the All-Russian Union of Towns 
also as war broke out.4 In August 1914, Rodzianko applied to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, (later the Viceroy at 
the Caucasus, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army) through a letter 
in which he expressed the concern and readiness of the society in the aid for the 
wounded soldiers. The reply of the Grand Duke was not in favor of cooperation of 
the army with the society5, but the deteriorating situation compelled the military 
leaders to realize that it would be unable to fulfill the task without the assistance of 
the civic organizations.  
The civic organizations, which Stavka then appealed to, were the Union of 
Towns and Zemstvos. The Unions were allowed to work as Red Cross organizations 
carrying the Red Cross insignia on their garments, equipments and on their official 
                                                 
2 ibid. 
3 M. D. Steinberg, V. M. Khrustalev, The fall of the Romanovs: Political dreams and personal 
struggles in a time of revolution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p.43 
4 V. M. Shevyrin, Zemskii i Gorodskoi Soyuzy 1914-1917: Analiticheskii obzor, Moscow: Institut 
nauchnoi informatsii po obshchestvennym naukam (INION RAN), 2000, p.58  
5 A. B. Astashov, “Soyuzy Zemstv i Gorodov”, p.171 
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documents, on the condition that the Unions would confine their activities for “the 
relief of the sick and the wounded soldiers during the present war”.6 However, the 
course of the war necessitated help of the Unions in many other areas. The supply of 
the army with munitions and equipment, and the care for the refugees, would be the 
new and vast areas of the help demanded by the military authorities with ever 
increasing frequency.7 Furthermore, the different peculiarities of the fronts required 
the participation of several other civic organizations in the relief efforts for the local 
population. 
 
3.1.1 The All-Russian Unions of Towns and Zemstvos and the Caucasian Front 
The first idea of the formation of the All-Russian Union of Towns dated back 
to 1905. Although the mayors of the cities convened conferences aimed at uniting 
their activities, the then prevalent legal system of the empire hindered the formation 
of such supra-organizational bodies. It was the war conditions, which facilitated the 
formation of the “All-Russian” type of organizations. The All-Russian Union of 
Zemstvos was formed in Moscow on July, 30 1914 at the congress of the authorized 
provincial zemstvos, and Union of towns came into being as a result of an agreement 
of 37 provincial towns and nine towns of districts, on August 8-9, 1914.8 The 
expenditures of the Union of Zemstvos and Union of Towns were mainly sponsored 
by governmental grants,9 and also by dues of the local organizations of the unions 
                                                 
6 N. J. Astrov, The Municipal Government and The All-Russian Union of Towns, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1929), p. 172 
7 ibid., p. 174 
8 ibid., p.183 
9 Pravila Predostovleniya Garantii Gosudarstvennogo Kaznacheistva, (Moscow: N.p., 1917) 
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and by donations. The organizations rapidly attracted the participation of many 
Russian towns and districts.  
Meanwhile, the towns of the Caucasus established an independent Union of 
Towns of the Caucasus, at a conference convened in Tiflis, on 12-14 September 
1914.10 However, with the outbreak of war at the Caucasian Front, its independence 
from the All-Russian Union of Towns impeded the organization of the relief efforts, 
so at another conference on 3 November 1914, the Caucasian Union of Towns 
became a special department of the All-Russian Union of Towns.11  
At the conference, which took place on September 12-14, 1914, the activities 
of the Caucasian Union of Towns and the Union of Zemstvos had been divided 
according to regions. According to this division, the activities of the Union of 
Zemstvos would be concentrated in the northern Caucasus whereas the Caucasian 
Union of Towns would organize relief efforts in the southern Caucasus. The 
occupied Ottoman territories were also included into the realm of the activities of the 
Caucasian Union of Towns with the deepening of the front beyond the Russian-
Turkish state borders.12 Since the whole organization was a response to the 
necessities of war, this division of the regions did not prevent the overlap of 
functions and activities of the two unions. The activities of the Unions at the 
Caucasian Front became so vital in a very short time that, the percentage of the 
Union hospitals constituted %71 of all at the Caucasian Front.13 
                                                 
10 Kratkii Otchet o Deyatelnosti Kavkazskogo Otdela Vserossiiskogo Soyuza Gorodov pomoshi 
bol’nym i ranennym voinam s momenta vozniknoveniya po 1-e fevralya 1915, Tiflis, 1915, p.1 
11 ibid., p. 11 
12 “Deyatel’nost’ Kavkazskogo Otdela Soyuza Gorodov”, Izvestiya Vserossiiskogo Soyuza Gorodov, 
1916, No:23, p.166-167 
13 Astashov, ibid., p.171 
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3.1.2 The Muslim Charitable Society of Baku (Bakû Müslüman Cemiyet-i 
Hayriyesi) 
Although the Caucasian Department of the All-Russian Union of Towns dealt 
with the relief organizations for the refugees and the peaceful population in the 
occupied regions, the activities of the Unions were mainly directed to the needs of 
the Christian, that is the Armenian population. The essence of this fact was mainly a 
consequence of the ethnic structure of the organization. Most of the officials of the 
Unions were of Armenian origin. The majority of the Muslims of the occupied 
regions had fled following the withdrawal of the Ottoman Army. However, a 
significant number stayed put, especially in the villages. The main social 
organization from the Russian Empire, which functioned in the occupied regions for 
the Muslim population was the Bakü Müslüman Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi (The Muslim 
Charitable Society of Baku). (Hereafter the Cemiyet-i Hayriye). The Cemiyet-i 
Hayriye was established during the turbulent times of 1905 by the Azerbaijani 
business elite, and the Viceroy Vorontsov-Dashkov confirmed the establishment of a 
Muslim charitable society on 10 October 1905.14 The Cemiyet-i Hayriye aimed at 
alleviating the desperate living conditions of the Muslims, suffering in the Armeno-
Azerbaijani Turkish struggles.  
The founding aim of the Cemiyet-i Hayriye was to help the miserable people 
of the Caucasian region and its activities were in line with this objective until the 
First World War. However, the world war brought even worse conditions for the 
Caucasian population especially for the part at the border of the Russian Empire with 
                                                 
14 Betül Aslan, Kardeş Kömeği (Yardımı) ve Bakû Müslüman Cemiyet-i Hayriyesi, (Ankara: Atatürk 
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Turkey, as well as for the Muslim population in the occupied regions of Turkey. The 
dire situation of the Muslim population at the Russian side of the border, who were 
frequently being accused of collaborating with the enemy, and the lamentable 
destiny of the population in the occupied regions found reflection in the pages of the 
Azerbaijani Turkish press and soon the refugees themselves appeared in Gence, 
Baku, and Tiflis.15 Region-wide fund-raising activities were organized, and the 
responsive public donated food, clothing, and every kind of personal wealth 
including the family heirlooms, and wedding presents. The public sensitivity, 
outpouring of the newspaper and journal articles, speeches and sermons, attempts of 
the prominent figures of the Azerbaijani Turkish elite, and especially of the Duma 
member Muhammed Yusuf Caferov, who was as a member of the ad hoc committee 
of the Duma for field hospitals16, urged the State Duma to grant governmental 
protection and a special credit for the Muslim refugees.17 
The Cemiyet-i Hayriye took official permission to function as a relief 
organization in the occupied territories in January 1915. Thereafter it decided to 
organize a special system of relief for the Muslims in the occupied regions, and 
appointed Dr. Hüsrev Paşa Bey Sultanov as its authorized representative.18 The 
Cemiyet-i Hayriye chose Kars as the center of the relief organizations for the regions 
of Kars and Batum, and for the districts of Tortum, Erzurum, Hınıs, Muş, Bayezid, 
and Diyadin.19 The center of the Cemiyet-i Hayriye in Baku, the Ismailiye building,20 
                                                 
15 ibid., pp.79-80 
16 Fuat Akhundov, “Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan Leaders (1918-1920) Mammad-Yusif Jafarov 
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18 ibid., p.77 
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was converted to a complex including a hospital with 150 beds, an orphanage for 200 
children, and a public kitchen.21 In coordination with the Administration of Refugees 
(working under the Viceroyalty, headed by General V. M. Tamamshev), the 
Cemiyet-i Hayriye took the responsibility of the care for Muslim orphans and opened 
four orphanages in Baku, four in Gence, two in Tiflis, one in Suşa, Nuha, Ahıska 
(Ahaltskhe), Şeki, Batum, Çakvi, Kantri, Kağızman, Ardahan, Oltu, Iğdır, Hınıs, 
Gümgüm (Varto).22 
Other Muslim charity organizations of the Caucasus, which had assisted the 
Cemiyet-i Hayriye in relief efforts for the suffering Muslim population were, the 
Muslim Women’s Charitable Society of Baku, the Muslim Charity Society of the 
Caucasus, the National Muslim Committee of Gence, the Society of Necat 
(Salvation), the Society for Spreading Education, and the Muslim Charity 
Organization of Erivan.23 
                                                                                                                                          
20 İsmailiye Building: Agha Musa Naghiyev, a rich oil baron of Baku, had built and offered as a gift 
to the Muslim Charity Society, a huge palace dedicated to the memory of his only son, Ismail, who 
had died from tuberculosis. The building, which later became known as “Ismailiye,” was burnt down 
by the Armenians in 1918. It was after the Soviets came to power in Baku when the monument was 
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(Fuad Akhundov, “Legacy of the Oil Barons”, Azerbaijan International, 2:2, Summer 1994, pp.43-
46) 
21 Fahrettin Erdoğan, Türk Ellerinde Hatıralarım, (İstanbul: Yeni, 1954), pp. 126-128 
22 B. Aslan, ibid. p.137 
23 B. Aslan, pp.173-184 
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3.2 Activities of the Relief Organizations in the Occupied Regions of Turkey 
3.2.1 The region of Van: 
The first sizable Ottoman territory to fell under the Russian occupation was 
the Van region. Following the Armenian revolt of April 191524, the Russian forces, 
predominantly the Armenian Druzhins,25 occupied the city, and except brief periods 
of tactical withdrawal in 1915 and in July-August 1916, Van had remained under 
Russian occupation until April 2, 1918. The city, with its exclusively Armenian 
population during the Russian occupation, became a stronghold of the Caucasian 
Committee of the All-Russian Union of Towns. (Hereafter cited as the Sogor). A. A. 
Atanasyan, the Sogor inspector, wrote in his report that, the Russian forces found in 
the region 11000 Armenians, 3000 Kurds, 500 Assyrians, 400 Yezidis, and 85 Turks. 
According to the 1912 statistics of the Armenian Patriarchate, in the whole vilâyet of 
Van there were 185,000 Armenians, 47,000 Turks, 32,000 settled and 40,000 
nomadic Kurds, 25,000 Yezidis, 18,000 Nestorians and Jakobite Assyrians, and 
3,000 gypsies.26 Before the war the city center itself had 42,000 inhabitants (22,450 
Armenians, 15,000 Turks)27, and there were 8 churches, 2 mosques, 26 schools, 2 
hospitals, 3 orphanages, 4 reading rooms and libraries, 15 cultural societies, 5 press 
                                                 
24 “In April 1915, …[an Armenian revolt was] organized in the city of Van, [Meanwhile], the Russian 
Caucasian Army began an offensive toward Van with the help of a large force of Armenian volunteers 
recruited from among refugees from Anatolia as well as local Caucasus residents.” Stanford J. Shaw, 
and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.2, (London, NY, 
Melbourne, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1978, pp.315 
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account on the activities of the volunteer Armenian druzhins may be found in: General G. Korganoff, 
La participation des Armenién à la Guerre Mondiale sur le Front du Caucase, 1914-1918, (Paris: 
Imprimerie Massis Editions, 1927))  
26 Justin McCarthy, Müslümanlar ve Azınlıklar, translated by: Bilge Umar, (İstanbul: İnkılap, 1998), 
p.47. Explaining the unreliable nature of the Patriarchate statistics, McCarthy analyses Ottoman, 
Armenian, and European estimated population accounts, and presents a medium number of all, that is 
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 57 
offices publishing 4 magazines and several newspapers.28. During the fierce fighting 
of the revolt of 1915, and during the Russian-Turkish military operations, the city 
and its environs was totally in ruins, almost all of the houses were demolished, and 
the 1915 harvest was lost.29 The city was in desperate need of aid from the Russian 
government and the relief organizations. The Sogor then, appointed Konstantin 
Saakovich Ambartsumyan as its representative in Van.30 With his relentless efforts, 
the city turned into a kingdom of the Sogor and the Armenians of the city named him 
“King Kostya”. The main street of the city was named after the Sogor (the Sogorskii 
prospekt) on which all the offices of the governmental and social organizations were 
located.31 The Sogor institutions in the city reached a significant number (20) and 
intensive activity by May 1916, but the functioning of the Sogor institutions were far 
from being efficient. The relief effort was performed hastily and without a general 
plan and coordination, and only the Armenian refugees benefited from the aid since 
the chief representative and the other Sogor staff were Armenians.32  
The Sogor founded a wide network of medico-sanitary aid for the city and the 
environs. The network consisted of one hospital, several sanitary assistance 
departments in different places, a department of quarantine, several disinfecting 
brigades and a pharmacy unit. The hospital was opened in February 1916, after the 
arrival of Dr. Mandinyan, who had considered the plans for a 150-bed hospital (was 
completed in June) and the system of medical aid with Ambartsumyan. Other than 
                                                                                                                                          
27 R. Bekgulyants, Po Turetskoy Armenii, Rostov-na-Donu, 1914, p.13 
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29 ibid. 
30 Ocherk deyatel’nosti Vserossiiskogo Soyuza Gorodov v Vanskom raione, Tiflis, 1916, p.1 
31Sergei Goredetskii, “V stran ruchev i vulkanov: Vanskie Portreti”, Kavkazskoe Slovo, 6 August 
1917, p.2  
32 Ocherk deyatel’nosti, p.2 
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Dr. Mandinyan, 3 nurses, 6 medical orderlies, 5 side-nurses and 2 male nurses, and 
an English medical team from the London Armenian Refugees Fund were working at 
the hospital. The English medical team consisted of a doctor, Dr Aspland, and three 
nurses.33 Due to general disorganization, the responsibilities of the doctors were also 
vague. They were dealing with each and every need of the hospital, even with the 
construction works, and these had resulted in an incomplete, malfunctioning hospital. 
The arbitrariness of the personnel was also an obstacle, for example Dr. Aspland was 
reported to refuse to examine “the uninteresting patients, elders or children”.34 
Adding to that, academician Nikolai Marr, who was conducting an archaeological 
expedition in the city, complained about the English doctor, for he engaged in the 
search of archaeological treasures rather than dealing with his patients.35 The 
miserable situation of the pharmacy department was also a big problem, which 
another inspector from the headquarters of the Sogor, inspector Goredetskii, depicted 
in his report on 3-months activities of the Sogor in the Van region. The conditions 
evolved from bad to worse, as the previous Sogor representative, then the commissar 
of Van, Ambartsumyan, stated in a briefing in August 1917.36  
The disinfection brigade, before which stood the vital task of cleansing the 
unhealthy city, was also malfunctioning. The ill-disciplined system and the 
                                                 
33 F. Shishmarov, “Spetsial’naya missiya ot angliiskogo obshestva (Armenian Refugees Fund)”, 
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insufficient number of personnel impeded the work. In May 1916, it was still 
possible to witness corpses at the outskirts of the city and all the streets were filthy. 
The brigade could only disinfect the buildings of the Sogor and the military 
institutions, and even could not accomplish the disinfection task of the personnel of 
the lake flotilla, which might be the main origin of the infectious diseases from the 
other side of the lake.37  
One of the few well-functioning institutions in the city was the quarantine 
department. It had obtained a quarantine room with modern disinfection equipment 
at the damaged building of the German hospital. Initially it was supposed to be used 
for the quarantine of the PoWs, however, the Sogor did not have the right to accept 
PoWs, and so the quarantine department was used for disinfection of the refugees.38 
Besides the medico-sanitary functions, the Sogor provided shelter and food 
for the majority of the population. There were 12 public kitchens, an orphanage, two 
refugee shelters, and several field canteens on the road to Hoy and Iğdır.39 Although 
the main public kitchen was well located, it also suffered from disorganization, and it 
could not meet the needs of the ever-growing number of refugees. In order to ease 
the privation of the refugees and to lessen the burden upon its institutions, the Sogor 
anticipated the participation of the refugees. However, the refugees, who found free 
shelter and food, were reluctant to work, “they do not even want to slice a loaf of 
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bread unless they were paid”.40 The conditions of May 1916 deteriorated by time, 
and famine conditions were threatening the city in September 1917.41 
For the temporary residence of the refugees there operated two shelters, one 
in the city of Van, and another, which was in very bad circumstances, in the Muslim 
suburb. There was also an orphanage.42 The orphanage, which was very well 
constructed for the needs of the orphans, including bedrooms, classroom, restrooms, 
court for gymnastic education, bath, laundry and gardens, was opened at the building 
of the previous German orphanage in 1915. Under the Russian occupation, it 
functioned as a place to gather the orphans of the region and to transfer them to 
Transcaucasia, but lacking the necessary personnel for investigation, the children 
were brought to the institution by other people or were applying themselves.43 
Approximately 300 children, mainly Armenians, were sheltered at the orphanage.44 
Five workshops of the Sogor, a blacksmith, a tin maker, a shoemaker, a bakery and a 
carpentry operated near the orphanage for the general needs of the Sogor and 
military institutions.45 
Because of the privations which had characterized the living of so many 
refugees, they were likely to be in more urgent need of help, so that, the Sogor in 
Van mainly functioned as a relief organization for the refugees. Nevertheless, 
starting from the second half of 1916, it opened some services for the military staff 
in the city, such as a general store and a coffee shop at the garrison. The main facility 
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of the Sogor, which was utilized by the army, was the transportation service. The 
service had 30 carts and 170 horses, which shuttled between Van and Hoy, especially 
carrying wounded and sick soldiers. Another transportation facility, which was 
provided by the Sogor, was the flotilla on the lake of Van. Since the city was short of 
many material, it became a necessity to establish a reliable communication line with 
the other side of the lake, and by the great efforts of the Sogor representative, 
Ambartsumyan, and other social organizations such as the All-Russian Union of 
Zemstvos, and society of Nmastamatuits46, barges and steam cutters were built for 
this purpose.47 By August 1916, the flotilla consisted of 4 steam cutters, and 10 
barges. They were cruising initially between Van and Tatvan, afterwards Ahlat, 
Adilcevaz, Akants, Arnis (Arın-Göldüzü), Panz (Çolpan), Noroshen (Alıçla), and 
Surp (Yelkenli) were added on to the list of destinations.48  
Other than the Sogor, several Russian, Armenian, and international relief 
organizations operated in Van. S. I. Tigranyan represented the Committee of Her 
Imperial Highness Tatiana Nikolayevna. The committee dealt with medical aid and 
the revival of the local artisanry. A team of doctors from this committee operated a 
medico-sanitary assistance department at Allur. The Local Committee of the 
Armenians was organized under the nachalnik, and later the governor, A.I. Termen. 
The Local Committee handled the municipal tasks such as the maintenance of the 
irrigation canals and of the drinkable water supplies, the resettlement of newly 
arriving refugees, and distribution of governmental rations. The Local Committee 
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temporarily functioned also as the highest judicial organ in the city.49 Another 
Armenian social organization was the United Committee, which consisted of the 
Armenian Charitable Society of the Caucasus, the Nmastamatuits, the Agricultural 
Committee and similar charity organizations. The United Committee mainly dealt 
with substantial aid, providing seeds, agricultural equipment, and also opened 
workshops. It was sponsored by the General Administration of Refugees, and 
through private donations.50  
The international relief organizations were also active in Van. The primary 
one was the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief. Upon the reports 
of Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, about the miserable situation of the Armenian 
population, the US government took a number of steps. The American Committee 
for Armenian and Syrian Relief was founded in 1915 with the support of President 
Woodrow Wilson. Dr. Wilson, Consul Smith, Mr. Gill, Mr. McCalm and Mr. Gressi 
represented the committee in Van where it assisted the organization of the cleansing 
of the city. The Committee employed some refugees in its activities and provided 
them with livestock, agricultural equipments and the like.51 The second international 
organization was the Lord-Mayor Fund of London for Relief of Armenia. The 
headquarters of the Fund in the Caucasus was in Tiflis, and Reverend Harold Buxton 
headed the delegation of the Fund.52 The activities of the Fund were divided into 
medical assistance and substantial aid. For the medical assistance Dr. Aspland and 3 
nurses were working in the Sogor hospital in Van, and for substantial aid, Mr. 
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Backhouse installed a project for the repair of the damaged houses in the city of Van. 
This project was delayed until the end of war due to the interference of the Russian 
soldiers. The Cossacks dismantled the wooden construction materials, such as roofs 
and tiles, and used them as firewood.53 
The relations of the popular organizations with the military authorities in Van 
were not without tension. The most important discord between the civil and military 
authorities arose in 1916. In July 1916, the Russian army tactically withdrew to the 
north of Van, in a maneuver in the face of a Turkish attack.54 Till the moment of the 
withdrawal, the military authorities in Van did not officially inform the civilian 
institutions and the population. However, the commander of the Russian corps, 
advised A.I. Termen to evacuate the city, but added that he was not authorized to 
give an official order. The army withdrew on July 28, 1916, and the population and 
all social organizations evacuated the city in panic.55 The results of the evacuation 
were disastrous for the city. All the organizations left, the population fled, the 
harvest of the year was lost, and looting raged the city. Late in August 1916, Termen 
appealed to the Sogor, and to other social organizations with the request of a quick 
return to the city, to the help of refugees, once again returning to Van.56 In the 
absence of an official order by the military authorities, the governor Termen was 
accused of provoking the population to flee. The General Staff of the Caucasian 
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Army published an official proclamation in the Caucasian newspapers, in which it 
was stated that the military authorities had not ordered an evacuation, and all the 
events were a result of groundless rumors, and the responsible figures would be 
punished.57 The governor, A. I. Termen was found guilty and was dismissed in 
November 1916.58 Another problem, which invoked tension between the military 
authorities and the civil organizations, was the fate of the lake flotilla of the Sogor. 
The military authorities did not want to allow the construction of such a flotilla, and 
afterwards they had confiscated it.59  
3.2.2 The Region of Bitlis and Muş: 
The area comprised Tatvan, Bitlis, the western shores of Lake Van and the 
valley of Muş, and remained under the Russian occupation until 8 August 1916. At 
the arrival of the Russian troops, all the villages and churches in the region had been 
destroyed and three quarters of the population had already been exterminated.60 
Infectious diseases had been prevailing uncontrollably in the region; the death toll 
had risen to 40 people a day, when the Russian army entered Tatvan on 1 February. 
The Union of Zemstvos founded a field hospital in Tatvan, however the personnel of 
the hospital suffered from epidemics, and in 2,5 months was replenished 3 times.61  
The Russian army occupied Bitlis also in February 1916. The Armenian 
population of the city had already perished, only a bunch of Armenians were found 
hidden at the field hospital run by a Turkish doctor, Mustafa Bey of Aleppo, at the 
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church of the Protestant American missioners.62 The Sogor assumed the control of 
the hospital and orphanage of the American mission, and opened a public kitchen for 
Armenian refugees, whose number was 352 by 25 May 1916, and increasing since 
then. At the same time, the Union of Zemstvos undertook the task of feeding 15,000 
Muslim refugees and looking after their orphans.63  
Following the occupation of the valley of Muş, five to seven thousand 
Armenian refugees gradually gathered from the vicinities. During the first months, 
the required food was supplied from the local stockpiles of grain, which were 
exhausted by time and famine conditions threatened the city by April 1916. The 
Central Armenian Committee and the Sogor commenced their activities in April 
1916, and from then on the former supplied food and the latter provided medical aid 
by opening a hospital and a sanitary assistance unit The Sogor also opened an 
orphanage in Muş and the orphans, who were gathered from around, were transferred 
to the Caucasus. Supplemental food rations from the Sogor stocks were needed only 
until the refugees were able to get their own produce from the land, which they 
would cultivate. Therefore, in order not to aggravate the food crisis, the Sogor 
resettled five thousand Armenian inhabitants in the evacuated villages. In Karakilise 
the Society of Fraternal Aid and the Armenian Agricultural Committee handled the 
resettlement of 2000 refugees. Thus, the majority of the refugees started to cultivate 
land with the aid of the mentioned organizations in the Bitlis-Muş region, with the 
temporary and conditional permission of the Viceroy. 
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In Artsap, the Armenian Committee of Moscow and the Central Armenian 
Committee were active in relief organizations. The Moscow Committee had a 
hospital with 30 beds, and a sanitary unit, whereas a united committee was formed in 
Hınıskale with the participation of the representatives of the Sogor, and the Society 
of Fraternal Aid This united committee organized the relief for 2000 refugees, 
predominantly women and children and 400 orphans, and opened a hospital of 50 
beds, an orphanage and a mill in Hınıs.64 Hınıs also became an important center for 
the activities of the Cemiyet-i Hayriye, which opened a branch in Hınıs, headed by 
Canik Efendi Botaş, who provided material aid, and opened a shelter for the elderly, 
and an orphanage for the Muslim population. The Muslim orphans were sent to the 
orphanages of The Cemiyet-i Hayriye at Kağızman, Tiflis and Baku.65  
3.2.3 The Region of Erzurum: 
Before the war, Erzurum city center had a population of 11,735 Armenians, 
40 Greek families and nearly 30,000 Muslims66 according to an Armenian traveler. 
The Muslim population could not be evacuated from the city unlike the case in other 
cities such as Van, Rize, and Trabzon.67 Mainly the Sogor and the Cemiyet-i Hayriye 
organized the relief organizations in the region.  
With the occupation of Erzurum, the military authorities called the Sarıkamış 
branch of the Sogor for the cleaning up of the city. Moreover, the military authorities 
demanded from the Sogor to respond to the nutritional needs of the war stricken 
residents of the city, of the refugees, and also of the workers of the Sarıkamış-
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Erzurum road.68 A disinfection brigade of 40 people was sent in February 1916, and 
by the end of the year it had 7 subdivisions active in the region. They buried 1,500 
Turkish corpses, and cleansed many buildings, mainly the military institutions, 
barracks, dormitories, baths, and also the private houses.69 In a city, which was raged 
by typhus, and in which the death rate among the 40,000 infected people was up to 
70%,70 the activities of the disinfection brigade was of utmost importance. Two 
hundred Turks and hundred Arabs [probably prisoners of war] were employed in the 
cleansing activities.71 The construction of baths was another measure against 
infections. The Sogor operated four baths for the officers, four for soldiers and one 
for the refugees in Erzurum. The field hospitals of the Sogor increased their 
capacities by time to strengthen struggle against epidemics, and by the end of 1916 
the Sogor hospitals had 665 beds: 225 surgical, 106 reserved for the PoWs, 150 for 
the typhus patients. However, that was not enough to meet the requirements of the 
situation and Dr. Markaryan, the officer of the Sanitary Department of the Sogor in 
Erzurum, asked the Central Committee of the Caucasian Department of the All-
Russian Union of Towns, to negotiate with the military authorities for permission to 
utilize the 2000 beds capacity of the military hospitals in the city.72  
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Malnutrition of the population was referred to as an important cause for the 
spread of epidemics, therefore, the medico-sanitary aid and nutritional help were 
perceived as interconnected for the prevention of infectious diseases. Aware of this 
fact, the Sogor tried to provision the refugees and inhabitants of the Erzurum region. 
In the city, the refugees were not original inhabitants, thus they were deprived of the 
resources of the established residents. The Sogor tried to meet their needs by public 
kitchens. In other parts of the region, in Pasinler Valley, however, the refugees were 
the inhabitants of the destroyed villages, so in order to guarantee the food supply, 
The Sogor organized a resettlement program of the refugees, in coordination with the 
Chief Administrator of the Refugees, General Tamamshev, and provided agricultural 
equipment, and credits for the temporarily settled refugees.73  
Another important task levied on the Sogor was the supply of food for the 
workers of the Erzurum-Sarıkamış road.74 However the scope of the task was not 
clearly defined by the military authorities. First of all, there were two different 
construction businesses in the mentioned direction; the railroad and the highway 
constructions. Second, the Russian Red Cross was also involved in feeding of 
workers. The Sogor sent two representatives to investigate the matter75, and the 
military authorities divided the region into two, one under the responsibility of the 
Russian Red Cross, and the other under the Sogor’s responsibility.76  
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Other than the main cities of the region, there were canteens in Cibok, Kötek, 
Hasankale, Karakaya-Gedik, Çat, Parmaksız, Çanak, Yüzbaş, Fama, Kame (Ağaçlı), 
Karaurgan, Agmali (Çatak), Omragom (Yeşilöz), Aliçekrek (Aliçeyrek); coffee 
shops in Deveboynu, Bardakçı; medico-sanitary assistance positions in Aliçekrek 
and Omragom; transportation units in Yüzbaş, Fama, Kame and Kan; baths in 
Agmali and Zivin (Süngütaşı). 
Since the majority of the population in the city was consisted of the Muslims 
the Sogor cooperated with the Cemiyet-i Hayriye branch in Kars for the organization 
of relief to the Muslims.78 The chief representative of the Cemiyet-i Hayriye in the 
occupied regions, Hüsrev Paşa Bey Sultanov, had also applied for permission, and 
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Erzurum 
1.Field hospital- General-diagnostic-400beds 
2.Field hospital- General-400beds 
3.Field hospital-Infectious diseases-150beds 
4.Hospital of Russian Technicians brigade-100beds 
5.Medico-sanitary assistance positions 
6.Dental cabinet 
7.Disinfection department 
8.Canteens 
9.Baths 
10.Storage 
11.Workshops 
Köprüköy 1.Field hospital for workers 2.Canteens 
Karakilise 
1.Canteens 
2.Orphanage 
3.Medico-sanitary assistance unit 
Hasankale 1.Canteens 2.Transportation station 
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the Cemiyet-i Hayriye started its activities in the city by March 1916,79(a few weeks 
after the occupation). Initially, the Cemiyet-i Hayriye sent food for the Muslim 
population, and the representatives of the Cemiyet-i Hayriye surveyed the 
requirements of the Muslims. Adding to nutritional requirements, both the 
representatives of the Cemiyet-i Hayriye and officials of the Sogor expressed the 
pressing need of a hospital for the Muslim population. The chief representative of the 
Sogor in Erzurum suggested to the representatives of Cemiyet-i Hayriye to open a 
hospital for the Muslims,80 and Sultanov applied to the Russian Red Cross, in March 
1916, in order to take permission for the establishment of a field hospital.81 Although 
there was no substantial evidence for the opening of a hospital by the Cemiyet-i 
Hayriye, news about the transfer of a hospital of Muslim charity organization to the 
Sogor, reveals its existence. In November 1916, the hospital was left under the 
management of the medico-sanitary department of the Sogor, and the expenses of 
this hospital would be sponsored by the Governor-Generalship of the occupied 
regions of Turkey by then.82  
The conditions of the Muslim orphans were worse than the Armenian 
orphans, since the Sogor was especially dealing with the latter. Although Muslim 
orphans in the Erzurum region were taken to the orphanages of the Sogor and the 
Moscow Armenian Committee83, their situation was miserable. Many orphans were 
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taken as servants and they were subject to inhumane treatment.84 The Cemiyet-i 
Hayriye took the responsibility of the Muslim orphans, and sent many of them to the 
orphanages in Tiflis and Baku 85. By 1917, there were thousands of Muslim orphans 
from the occupied regions in Baku and they were in very decent conditions.86 The 
Cemiyet-i Hayriye authorized a delegation headed by Seyidov, to open a branch in 
Erzurum, and Seyidov stayed in the city until the end of Russian occupation and in 
coordination with the Muslim city administration of Hakkı Pasha,87 which played an 
important role in preventing Armenian atrocities against the Muslim population.88  
Hasankale and the valley of Pasinler were the other important places of the 
relief activities of The Cemiyet-i Hayriye in the Erzurum region. The relief in 
Hasankale was organized by the Sarıkamış branch, which opened a public kitchen, 
distributed food provisions and cloths, repaired a destroyed water resort and 
established an Education Society with the participation of Muslim soldiers of the 
Russian Army.89 The Cemiyet-i Hayriye opened a field hospital and a field kitchen 
for Muslim refugees in the valley of Pasinler. 
In the Erzurum region, the last territory occupied by the Russian armies was 
Erzincan. In Erzincan The Sogor had a public kitchen serving 400 peoples a day. The 
Armenian Committee of Moscow had sent food and cereals for plantation, however 
insufficient. The aid was distributed in the city, but the surrounding places could not 
benefit from it. The Sogor resettled some of the refugees in the villages, but they 
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returned en masse to Erzincan, since these villages became a target for Kurdish 
tribes.90  
The Cemiyet-i Hayriye also founded its branch in Erzincan. The center of 
relief was the mosque of Gerek, and the Muslim part of the city was divided into 7 
districts with muhtars. The Russian administration did not allow this system to 
function. Although the succeeding representatives Cafer and Mazhar beys could not 
stay long in the city, the last representative, Abdulmabut Bey managed to stay and 
organize relief, and he aroused social consciousness of the Muslim population. 
During his presence he actively took part in the prevention of Armenian atrocities 
against the Muslims, and he left the city upon the withdrawal of the Russian Army.91 
3.2.4 The region of Trabzon  
Before the war, the city center of Trabzon had a total population of 51,016, 
(29,168 Turks, 13,190 Orthodox Greeks, 7,121 Armenians, 1,453 Catholics).92 After 
fierce fighting near Of,93 the Turkish Army and the majority of the Turkish 
population had evacuated Trabzon on 16 April 1916.94 “The Russian General 
[Liakhov] was received at the outskirts of the city by a deputation of citizens 
[exclusively of Christian citizens] headed by the American consul,”95 and the 
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Russian forces occupied the city on 18 April 1916. In the meantime, the city was left 
to the control of Greek gendarmes, since the new population of the city, which was 
approximately 15,000, consisted of Greeks.96 Since the city had surrendered without 
fighting, it was spared destruction. The Muslim population had evacuated the city 
leaving everything intact; even the closed stores were full of commodities, the 
military and civilian administrative buildings, bridges, barracks, and houses were all 
in good condition, but plundered by the Greeks.97 The Sogor inspectors, Knyaz 
Argutinskii-Dolgorukii and A. I. Mitkevich who arrived at the city after the 
occupation, and found the city almost at European standards, with clean streets, well-
built houses, pavements, street illuminations, sewer system, and water supplies, 
though in oriental style.98 The buildings were decorated with the flags of the United 
States of America, denoting that they were under the protection of the United 
States.99 The medical conditions were satisfactory, although there was only one 
military field hospital. 
Since the location of Trabzon was perceived as a remedy for the supply 
problem and also because the city was at a close point to the new western line of the 
Caucasian Front, the Russian military authorities ascribed more significance to the 
city and the region than the other places in occupied territories. Initially, a temporary 
military administration was founded, headed by General Yablochkin who was 
empowered with the rights of a governor-general. Besides this temporary Governor-
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General, a “constructor of the fortified region of Trabzon”, Major General Schwartz, 
functioned, and under them, there was a city administration (gorodskaya uprava) 
formed of the residents of the city, headed by a prominent Greek.100 Although the 
Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Trabzon, Chrysantos, did not take 
part in the city administration, he enjoyed real influence on the inhabitants of the 
city. Initially, the city administration was exclusively a Greek political entity, 
however, after the return of a significant number of Muslims to the city, two Muslim 
members, Karlıkzade Hafız Şevket and Zegirzade Zühtü İbrahim, were appointed to 
the city administration.101 
This multi-headed structure of the new administration appeared to be 
destructive for the city. For the sake of centralization, after the proclamation of 
Prikaz no.739, Major General Schwartz was appointed as the commander of the 
fortified region on June 20, 1916,102 and he assigned the duties of the nachalnik to 
Sergei Rudolfovich Mintslov, who had good relations with the city elite. He actively 
got involved in social organizations, and tried to alleviate the problems of the native 
population with the Russian rulers. He initiated the publication of a local Russian 
newspaper, Trapezondskii Voyennyi Listok. The newspaper was published in an 
abandoned Ottoman press. The first number appeared in November 1, 1916 and 
published daily till June 1917. The paper was in the format of a daily telegraph 
published 6 days in a week, and on Mondays was printed in the format of a 
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newspaper giving local news besides the news from Russia proper. Other than 
Trapezondskii Voennyi Listok, a number of Greek newspapers were published in the 
city, such as Efxinos Pontus, Icho Tou Pontus, Pontikos, Logos, I Komnini, and 
Epochi,103 and a publicist, Mustafa Sırrı, took permission to publish a Turkish daily, 
Trabzon Gazetesi.104  
Even the appointment of S. R. Mintslov as the acting nachalnik, could not 
reconcile the Russian administration with the residents of the city and the Greek city 
administration had resigned in late November 1916, and Major General Schwartz 
appointed a Russian subject (Karaim) from the region of Kars, Dr. Kefeli as the head 
of the city administration. This appointment strained the relations further, and the 
Greek elites displayed their dissatisfaction in different boycotts such as not 
participating in the elections of the judges in February 1917.105  
The Russian rule failed in every task it took upon. The construction works 
were proceeding sluggardly in a disorganized way. Although the Viceroy, General 
Yudenich and General Yanushkevich were briefed about the huge construction 
projects at different times, projects were generally left on paper.106 The police system 
was ineffective in preventing crime, which were escalating by time. The sanitary 
conditions and supply of the city were rapidly deteriorating. The influx of 
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malnourished soldiers and starving refugees rendered the city unprotected against 
epidemics.107  
The Sogor initiated its activities under such conditions. An important point of 
the report of the Sogor inspector, Argutinskii-Dolgorukii, was about the worsening 
sanitary conditions in the city. The Sogor took over the only hospital, which was left 
by the Turkish administration,108 however, it was not sufficient for the worsening 
conditions. The Sogor opened special barracks for the infectious diseases in July 
1916,109 and the foundation of hospitals in Trabzon, Gümüşhane, Rize and Cevizlik 
was planned. The representative of the Sogor in Trabzon, Gogolashvili,110 appealed 
to General Shwartz, asking permission to open a large field hospital with 500 beds in 
Cevizlik, but, though the general initially did not approve, later he gave permission 
for a 100 beds hospital in the defined location.111 Other than the Sogor, the Russian 
Red Cross opened hospitals in the city and in Soğuksu, which were also matters of 
conflict between the civilian and military authorities. A general from the military 
administration demanded the evacuation of the hospital at Soğuksu for he would use 
the building as a summer residence. The head of the city administration, Dr. Kefeli, 
in his turn, tried to acquire the building of the Red Cross hospital in the city as his 
residence. The conflicts were resettled in favor of the Red Cross upon the 
interference of the Viceroyalty.112 Although the Sogor and other institutions 
                                                 
107 ibid., pp.73-74 
108 “V Trapezund (Nasha Beseda s Trapezundskim politsmaisterom)”, Kavkazskoe Slovo, 25 June 
1916, p.2 
109 Bulleten’ Mediko Sanitarnogo Otdela Glavnogo Kavkazskogo Komiteta Vserossiiskogo Soyuza 
Gorodov, no.4, (10 December 1916), p.22 
110 Mintslov, Trapezundskaya, p.236 
111 Bulleten’ Mediko Sanitarnogo Otdela Glavnogo Kavkazskogo Komiteta Vserossiiskogo Soyuza 
Gorodov, no.4, (10 December 1916), pp.50-51 
112 Mintslov, Trapezundskaya, pp.222-223 
 77 
managed to establish several field hospitals in and around Trabzon, due to the 
disorganization and malfunctioning of the city administration to cleanse the city and 
provide sufficient food for the population, and due to obstacles from the military 
authorities, sanitary conditions gradually worsened.113  
Besides worsening medico-sanitary conditions, there was the problem of the 
care for many unprotected Armenian children, hidden during the deportation of the 
Armenian population by the local Greeks, and some Muslims, and by the American 
consul. Although the Charitable Society of Batum then collected those children, the 
Sogor inspector Knyaz Argutinskii-Dolgorukii proposed an organized research for 
the orphans survived and opening of an orphanage for them.114 Upon the report of 
Knyaz Argutinskii-Dolgorukii, in May 1916 A. S. Babov was appointed for the 
investigation of the Armenian orphans in the region.115 He organized a commission 
of 5 people, and as a result of his investigation, 100 Armenian children were 
collected and sent to Batum and Kobulet, and were placed in the orphanages of the 
Armenian Charitable Society.116 It was also mentioned in the Armenian sources that 
an Armenian committee from the Caucasus collected thirty-three Armenian orphans, 
which were held hostage by the Turks.117 
The institutions of the charitable societies in Trabzon also served as schools. 
The representatives of the civilian organizations under the leadership of the acting 
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nachalnik of the city and the redactor of Trapezondskii Voyennyi Listok, Sergey 
Rudolfovich Mintslov, founded a Society of Enlightenment in Trabzon. They 
appealed to the civilian and military hospitals to enlist the illiterate patients and to 
inform the Society for the available hours of their hospitals for lectures. The Society 
had its meetings at the building of the postal treasury, and the office of Trapezondskii 
Voyennyi Listok served as the contact point.118 By February 1917, the mentioned 
public figures decided to reorganize the Society with more elaborate aims, such as 
the foundation of a school and a library for the soldiers, and organizing theatre 
shows. The first activity to raise money for these objectives had been a concert-
cabaret at the hotel Rossiya, and after this performance, a general meeting would be 
convened.119 However, General Schwartz intervened in the formation, and demanded 
from the public figures to elect personalities selected by himself as the head and 
members of the Society. The Society did not yield to the instructions of the general, 
and the general did not give permission for the future activities of the Society in 
response. Hence, the civilian initiative was once more impeded by the military 
orders.120 The Local Society of Enlightenment resumed its activities after the 
outbreak of revolution in March 1917,in Petrograd. In April 1917, they opened a 
library, started to collect books, and subscribed to 50 journals and newspapers.121  
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The philanthropic societies were active also in other cities and towns of the 
Trabzon region. The Sogor operated a field hospital in Ellev (Görele),122 a public 
kitchen in Zefanos123, a medico-sanitary assistance unit and a canteen at Hamsiköy, 
coffeeshops at Kala and Drona, baths and laundry at Fol, and a mobile unit to search 
for orphans at Gülümhane.  
The All Russian Union of Zemstvos had a field hospital in Polathane,124 and 
the Russian Red Cross had a hospital, and orphanage in Bayburt. The orphanage 
functioned especially for Muslim orphans, since the Armenian orphanage accepted 
exclusively the Armenians. The Red Cross personnel in Bayburt had very intimate 
relations with the Muslim population so much so that, the nurses adopted pseudo 
Muslim names.125 
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Although the Muslim population in the city of Trabzon was almost 
nonexistent, Muslims in the in the surroundings of Trabzon did not leave their 
villages,127 and some of the Muslim refugees were returning to the region. The 
conditions of the villagers and the returning refugees were not better than the Muslim 
population in the other occupied territories. These conditions were alleged to be 
dangerous for the acting army, and the military authorities got in contact with the 
                                                 
126 Uchrezhdeniye Kavkazskogo Otdela, pp.13-14 
127 S. R. Mintslov, Statisticheskie ocherki Trebizonda, (Trebizond: 1916), pp.4-20 
Table 2. The Sogor institutions in the Trabzon region by 1917:126 
Trabzon 
1. Infection barracks No.1 (for serious cases-100beds) 
2. Infection barrack-50beds 
3. Field hospital No. 4 (for refugees) 
4. Dental cabinet 
5. Medico-Sanitary assistance units 
6. Bacteriological laboratory 
7. Medico-sanitary construction brigade  
8. Orphanage 
9. Bread distribution unit 
10. Transportation unit 
11. Disinfection unit 
12. Storages (commodity, food, pharmacy) 
13. Pharmacy 
14. Baths (separate for senior and junior officers, soldiers, 
refugees, and patients) 
Cevizlik 
1. Field hospital No.3 
2. Medico-sanitary-assistance unit 
3. Canteens 
4. Laundry 
5. Bakery 
6. Baths 
Zigana-
Hanları 
1. Laundry 
2. Bath 
3. Medico-sanitary assistance unit 
4. Canteen 
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Batum branch of the Cemiyet-i Hayriye in June 1916,128 and demanded the 
organization of the relief for the Muslims. The Cemiyet-i Hayriye favorably 
responded to the demand, and founded a branch in Trabzon to organize the aid for 
the Muslim population.129 An Azerbaijani Turkish officer of the Russian Army 
managed the branch, and local personalities were also employed in the activities.130 
Apart from providing material aid, the Cemiyet-i Hayriye was active in the 
settlement of the judicial conflicts of the Muslims with the Russian civil and military 
institutions.131  
The ineffective security system of the Russian administration left the Muslim 
population defenseless against Greek and Armenian atrocities which were 
intensified, as in other regions, after the withdrawal of the Russian forces in 1918.132 
Throughout and after the end of the occupation, the Cemiyet-i Hayriye clandestinely 
but actively participated and even pioneered Muslim resistance. They congregated 
the Muslim population in relatively secure districts of the city133, and the Muslim 
soldiers of the Russian army took part in reconnaissance activities, in order to avert 
the Greek or Armenian attacks on the Muslim population.134 The last favor of the 
Cemiyet-i Hayriye was warning about the plans of the Armenians to blow up the 
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arsenal in the city. Although they could not prevent the sabotage, no one suffered 
among the Muslim population.135 
Another society, which took part in the relief organizations for the Muslim 
population of the coastal region, was the Georgian Charity Organization of Batum. 
Their activities stemmed also from  political considerations. The Georgian Society 
favored the Laz population of the region for help, identifying them as Muslim 
Georgians.136 The Society opened offices in Rize and Trabzon, distributed food in 
the region, founded an orphanage and a school for the “children of Laz” in Rize.137 
In addition to these activities in the occupied regions, they dealt with the problem of 
the Turkish civilian prisoners of war in Russia. According to a Georgian newspaper, 
Sakartvelo, Turkish subjects of ethnic Georgian Muslims [Laz] origin from the 
occupied regions, involved in commercial activities at different places of the Russian 
Empire, were arrested as subjects of the enemy government, and were exiled to the 
northern provinces of the Russian Empire. Taking the case of the returning Armenian 
subjects of Turkey as a precedent, the newspapers suggested that the Georgian 
Charitable Society should defend the rights of the Georgian Muslims and provide 
their return to their residences, which were by then had already become Russian 
territory.138 
Other than the Cemiyet-i Hayriye and the Georgian Charitable Society, the 
Viceroy also intervened in the relief organizations for the Muslim population of the 
coastal region. In October 1916, Nikolai Nikolayevich assigned a special credit to 
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provide food for the Muslims, and appointed V. M Tamamshev, chief of the 
administration of refugees, to organize the distribution of food. The latter appealed to 
the representatives of the Sogor with the request of opening food storages and 
distribution points on the directions of Fol-Trabzon and Trabzon-Gümüşhane.139 
Thereafter, the Muslims also benefited from the Sogor aid.140 
Concluding Remarks 
Although the Sogor, the Cemiyet-i Hayriye and various other organizations 
were involved in the relief activities for the Muslim and Christian populations of the 
occupied regions, the results were far from being satisfactory. Even in the main 
cities, famine and epidemics prevailed by 1917,141 and there were some places to 
which none of the organizations had reached.142 The worsening conditions of the 
occupied regions were reflected in the newspapers, and on this occasion, the first 
attempt to regulate the activities was made by the Caucasian Viceroyalty in February 
1917. The Supply Department of the Viceroyalty decided to centralize the relief 
organizations. The activities of the civilian and governmental organizations would be 
united; the commodity and money aid would be distributed fairly and without 
discrimination towards race and religion. In order to prevent disorganization, a 
special convention was assembled under the presidency of the Governor-General. 
The military officials responsible for the supply of the army, representatives of the 
relief organizations and other persons whose experiences might be useful 
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participated in the convention. A consultation bureau, and local branches of this 
bureau to determine local needs and to organize relief in these localities were 
established by the convention. The whole structure would be formed by the 
Governor-Generalship.143 
However, due to the turbulent events of following months, the central system 
could not be installed. The disorganization problem was again discussed in a meeting 
of the Armenian social organizations in May 1917. The main problem was restated 
as the nonexistence of a central administration to regulate the relief organization, but 
this meeting also was in vain.144 The Governor-Generalship of the occupied regions, 
which was identified as being responsible for the centralization of the relief 
organizations, had dealt with the establishment of the administrative structure and 
the security system of the region rather than provisioning the population.145  
The inefficiency of the occupation administration led social organizations to 
undertake the huge task of feeding and healing a population of 800,000 in a rough 
geography. Although the government provided credits to the Sogor, the Cemiyet-i 
Hayriye and other organizations, and although these organizations raised funds 
through private donations, the aid sent to the region was not sufficient. The medico-
sanitary aid was also left upon the shoulders of the social organizations, which had 
difficulty in employing the necessary number of personnel. The Governor-
Generalship planned to send two doctors to each of the 29 okrugs in the occupied 
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regions, but was able to send doctors to only 11 okrugs; moreover only one doctor 
could be sent to some of these 11 okrugs.146  
The discriminative approach of the organizations, which was outlawed by the 
convention of February 1917, was another shortcoming in the relief activities. 
Mainly the philanthropists came to the help of the Christian, i.e., the Armenian 
population; that is to say, the Muslim population could hardly benefit from relief. 
Even the Viceroy had to intervene on behalf of the Muslims, as he instructed the 
Sogor representatives to open special canteens for Muslims, in the Trabzon region. 
The subsequent part of this study is dealing with the academic explorations 
conducted by Russian scientists in eastern and northeastern Anatolia. 
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4. CHAPTER 4: ACADEMIC STUDIES 
During the relatively short period of occupation, the conquered regions of 
Turkey became a scene for the activities of Russian academic institutions, as was the 
case for other territories occupied by the Russian Empire. In the 19th century, the 
Russian governments had initiated the formation of special institutions to study the 
peculiarities of the Caucasus, and Turkestan. Upon the successful military advance 
of Russian troops deep into Turkey, the academic establishments of the Russian 
Empire diverted their activities also to the occupied regions of Turkey, which were 
not accessible prior to the war. There were also cases when they were called for 
explorations by certain state offices as a part of wartime requirements. Hence, 
Russian academicians carried out intensive and wide range of academic studies in 
the occupied regions. 
The first group of scientists who were called to the occupied territories was 
geographers and botanists to study the colonization prospects of the region. 
However, due to wartime difficulties, and depending on the unfavorable attitude of 
the military authorities, these expeditions and explorations did not satisfy the 
Ministry of Agriculture and its representatives in the occupied regions.1  
Another group of scientists were the archaeologists interested in the historical 
and architectural treasures of the region. Their main focus of interest was exploring, 
registering and preserving the historical and archaeological monuments of different 
civilizations that had suffered drastically in the detrimental conditions caused by 
military activities and ethnic strife. Moreover, ethnographers and historians came to 
the region and made or attempted to make explorations. Various academic 
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institutions, namely, the Russian Academy of Sciences, Imperial Russian Museum of 
Alexander III, and the Caucasian Museum in Tiflis, planned these studies. The 
Ministries of Finance and Public Enlightenment had been the sponsors of the 
academic studies, all of which were conducted with the approval and under 
supervision of the military authorities of the occupied regions.  
Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich, the president of the Archaeological 
Society of Moscow, and Grafina Uvarova, the president of the Imperial 
Archaeological Society, wrote letters to the Viceroy at the Caucasus, Grand Duke 
Nikolai Nikolayevich, on 11 March 1916, requesting the preparations of necessary 
regulations for the preservation of the archaeological treasures of the occupied 
regions. In his letter, Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich also inquired about the 
possibility of the attachment of archaeologists to the staffs of the marching armies.2  
The response of the Viceroy, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich revealed the 
fact that, the problem of the preservation of the cultural and historical monuments at 
the Caucasian Front had also constituted a matter of concern for the military 
authorities. The Viceroy informed Georgii Mikhailovich that he had instructed the 
senior commanders at the front to take necessary measures for the preservation of the 
historical monuments in their respective territories. Furthermore, the Viceroy stated 
that, although the peculiar conditions of war hindered the appointment of 
archaeologists to the army staffs, with special permissions, they might conduct 
archaeological studies in the region.3  
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The matters of preservation, and the status of the archaeologists, were 
regulated by a special Prikaz of the Viceroy. Prikaz no.117 on the preservation of the 
cultural artifacts, buildings, and archaeological sites was issued on 30 March 1916. 
The Prikaz served as the main official document founding the basis of all scientific 
studies in the region. By the Prikaz, the churches, mosques, monasteries, cemeteries, 
archives, libraries, museums with all contents especially historical manuscripts and 
books, all the inscriptions and decorations on steles, rocks and hills, were all claimed 
to be state property and declared to be under the protection of the Russian state. The 
Prikaz also regulated prospective archaeological studies in the region. It stipulated 
that, all the explorative studies would be conducted with the special permission of 
the Commander-in-Chief (the Viceroy) and under the supervision of local 
commanders.4  
Thus, by the confirmation of the military authorities and upon the 
assignments of the academic institutions, N. Y. Marr, I. A. Orbeli, S. V. Ter-
Avetisyan, E. Takaishvili, N. L. Okunev, F. I. Uspenskii, and I. Ya. Stelletskii 
organized short or long expeditions. These scientists accomplished, to a considerable 
extent, the huge task of the registration and conservation of the monuments with the 
participation of many other archaeologists, photographers, and technicians.  
4.1 Archaeological Expeditions to Eastern Anatolia 
The first region to attract the Russian scientists was the Van region, which 
was the first region to fell under the Russian occupation. This region, especially the 
city of Van, which was known as Tushpa, the capital of the Urartu kingdom between 
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the 13th and 8th centuries BC, had already been a focus of interest for the Russian 
archaeologists even before the war. The first Russian archaeologist sent to Van was 
I. A. Orbeli5 in 1912. He conducted research at the fortress of Van and Toprakkale. 
This preliminary survey of Orbeli and Boris Vladimirovich Farmakovskii6’s report 
on “Stone friezes with carved figures from Van” in 1914, invoked scientific interest 
and academic N. Ya. Marr7, who had been involved in archaeological and linguistic 
studies in the Caucasus for many years, proposed the establishment of a special 
commission for research and excavations at Toprakkale and Van under the Oriental 
Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences.8 The department prepared a 
protocol for the commission, which would undertake the task of explorations on the 
antiquity of Van and neighboring places. Since the mentioned places were in the 
vicinity of the Russian border, it was stated at the same meeting that particularly 
Russian scientists should conduct the explorations. Hence, the departments assigned 
I. A. Orbeli prepare a survey in the summer of 1914. Although the Ministry of Public 
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Enlightenment, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave permission and guaranteed 
the expenditures, the outbreak of war suspended the projects.9  
4.1.1 The First Expedition of Ter-Avetisyan 
The war, on the one hand, disrupted the earlier plans of archaeologists, but on 
the otherhand, it laid down new possibilities before them in the course of time. 
Following the occupation of the region of Van by the Russian armies in 1915, The 
Russian Academy of Sciences immediately reactivated the prewar plans about 
archaeological studies. Being the director of the Commission for the Preservation of 
the Antiquities at the Caucasian Front, N. Ya. Marr described the detrimental 
conditions of the region for archaeological artifacts and stressed the necessity of the 
conservation in a conference at the Oriental Department of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences convened in summer 1915. Upon the resolutions of this conference, the 
senior professor from the Department of Archaeology of the Caucasian Museum in 
Tiflis, S. V. Ter-Avetisyan, applied to the Viceroy at the Caucasus, for a preliminary 
survey on account of the Russian Academy of Sciences.10 The purpose of this study 
was to survey the Van region and to register manuscripts, archaeological monuments 
and sites in order to prevent further destruction.11 Since the artifacts and manuscripts 
to be registered during the survey would be predominantly related to religion, Ter-
Avetisyan appealed to the Catholicos to have monks accompany of the survey.12 Ter-
Avetisyan’s journey began from Tiflis on 28 November 1915, and the first 
monument to be registered was the church at Saray. Ter-Avetisyan collected 
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manuscripts, which were damaged and spread all over, from the destroyed church. 
The second site of examination was Vastan. The commander of the Frontier Corps, 
General Kulebyakin, had already prepared a list and current features of the 
architectural monuments in Vastan. The General also actively cooperated with the 
expedition team of Ter-Avetisyan through their work.13 They registered the Vastan 
mosque, mausoleums and the monasteries of Chagar Surp-Nishan and the Mother of 
God. The mosque and the monasteries were totally plundered and partially 
demolished.  
Turning in the direction of Van, the expedition staff visited the village of 
Artamed to examine the inscriptions from the time of the Kingdom of Van and the 
famous irrigation canals of Semiramid. In the city of Van, which was almost totally 
ruined, the Ter-Avetisyan expedition prepared a list of mosques and churches. The 
churches in the Armenian suburb of the city had been destroyed and plundered. The 
mosques had shared a similar fate. The beautiful tiles and faiences of the Kurşun 
Camii (Lead Mosque) were stripped off and manuscripts found in the mosque were 
thrown everywhere, as was the case in the churches.14 The fortress of Van, 
Toprakkale and the Port of Meher were the last sites of examination in the city.15 
After the expedition the team copied the illegible inscriptions on the surface, 
photographed and drew the plans of the fortress and caves. Then, they left the city 
for the monasteries on the islands of Akhtamar, Lim (Kadir Adası), Ktuts, and 
Varak. They collected the surviving manuscripts, photographed and drew the plans 
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of the monasteries. The Monastery of Lim was destroyed and all the manuscripts had 
disappeared along with other valuable items. Although the building of the Varak and 
Ktuts monasteries were damaged, their libraries remained intact, and were 
transferred to Echmiadzin by Ter-Avetisyan. At the end of the two-month long 
expedition, the total number of the manuscripts brought by Ter-Avetisyan to 
Echmiadzin was 1087.16 Cuneiform steles, ancient and medieval armory, and other 
historical and ethnographic materials were delivered to the Caucasian Museum.17 
The field diaries of Ter-Avetisyan were submitted to the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, and the Islamic manuscripts collected during the expedition were delivered 
to the Asian Museum of the Academy. These Islamic manuscripts were studied by I. 
A. Falev, who was also charged with the task of registration of particularly Islamic 
monuments and cultural artifacts in Eastern Anatolia.18 
4.1.2 Archaeological and Ethnographical Expeditions to the region of Van 
The results of the Ter-Avetisyan expedition were beyond expectations. In a 
speech on 10 March 1916 at the Oriental Department of Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Marr suggested renewal of a systematic study in the region. The Oriental 
Department conferred the task of organizing an expedition to N. Ya. Marr and 
Veselovskii, and they appointed I. A. Orbeli to undertake the mission. Marr found 
Orbeli competent enough to accomplish such an explorative study in a region where 
he had worked before. For his own studies, Marr planned to devote the summer of 
1916 for the excavations in Ani. Besides, as the director of the Commission for the 
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Preservation of the Antiquities at the Caucasian Front, he decided to travel along the 
northern shores of the Lake Van, through the places, which had not been visited by 
S. V. Ter-Avetisyan. After all, Marr intended to visit Van on his way back to Tiflis, 
just in order to familiarize with the results of the Orbeli expedition, which was 
planned to be concluded by then.19  
However, the peculiar conditions of war compelled Marr to lead the 
expedition himself.20 The Oriental Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
and the Ethnographical Department of the Russian Museum of Alexander III applied 
to the Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich for the approval of two expeditions. The 
first one was an archaeological expedition according to the projects of 1914, which 
would be headed by N. Ya. Marr, and second one was an ethnographical expedition 
to be led by A. A. Miller.21 The Grand Duke, petitioned to the Tsar on 29 March 
1916, and the latter signed the petition denoting his imperial consent and added with 
his handwriting “need to hurry”.22 
Thus, the two expeditionary teams, which departed from Petrograd, arrived in 
Tiflis on 17 June 1916. The first team was the archaeological expeditionary team of 
Marr, and consisted of Marr, Orbeli, P. E. Knyagintskii, and the photographer, A. M. 
Vruir. The second team, which aimed at conducting an ethnographical expedition, 
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ohrany pamyatnikov v raione voennikh deistvii”, Izvestiya Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, Vol. 10, 
1916, p.1481 
19 Vera Andreevna Mikhankova, Nikoai Yakovlevich Marr: Ocherk ego zhizni, (Moscow, Leningrad: 
Izdatel’stvo Akademicheskii Nauk SSSR v Leningrade, 1949), p.243; Marr, Arheologicheskaya 
Ekspeditsiya, p. 2 
20 Mikhankova, ibid. 
21 RGIA F.530, o.1, d.63, ll.7 reverse-8 
22 RGIA F.530, o.1, d.63, l.9-9reverse 
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consisted of the ethnographer and anthropologist A. A. Miller, A. G. Aleni and I. P. 
Makinyants.23 
The archaeological expedition managed to start early enough to take 
advantage of the aftermath of the war; that is, to travel with military protection and 
aid.24 In the region of Van, Marr and his staff employed soldiers in their excavations. 
The main site of his research was Toprakkale, where German, French and English 
travelers or archaeologists had made unsystematical excavations that had 
complicated the studies of Marr. Meanwhile, I. A. Orbeli was dealing with 
inscriptions and dispersed stones with cuneiforms in the city and around. His 
research led him to two niches below the fortress at the slope of the Rock. These 
niches were known as Hazine Kapısı (the Port of Treasury) referring to the presence 
of a treasure beneath. Fortunately, the existence of a shrine, (the tomb of a Muslim 
saint, Şeyh Abdurrahman Baba Tekkesi), prevented treasure-hunters from digging.25 
Orbeli decided to excavate the niches having identified a semi-visible inscription. 
This excavation surpassed the highest expectations of the scientists. At the western 
niche a huge stele was found with cuneiform inscriptions. N. Ya. Marr read the 
inscription, which belonged to the King Sardur II, (Marr would publish a detailed 
description of it in 1922.) At the eastern niche a pedestal of another stele was 
exposed, but the stele was not in its place. While looking for the stele or its parts in 
the neighborhood, Orbeli found some of its parts at the church of St. Isaac.26  
                                                 
23 “Nauchnye Ekspeditsii”, Kavkazskoe Slovo, 4 June 1916, p.3 
24 N. I. Platonova, “Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr –Arkheolog i organizator Arkheologicheskoi Nauk”, 
Arkheologicheskie Vesti, no.5 (1996-1997), St. Petersburg, 1998, p.376 
25 N. Marr, I. Orbeli, Arkheologicheskaya Ekspeditsiya 1916 goda v Van, p.8 
26 ibid., pp.19-20 
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The second expedition, which aimed at exploring the region from an 
ethnographical aspect could not be realized. Members of that expedition were either 
employed at the military institutions to translate documents from local languages in 
Tiflis or were charged with works related to the activities of the Caucasian Museum 
there.27 Thus they were unable to leave the city. Another unaccomplished 
ethnographical survey was to be undertaken by P. A. Falev. In coordination with the 
Marr expedition, Falev intended to conduct an ethnographical and linguistic survey 
among the Muslim population of the occupied territories of Eastern Anatolia. On his 
way to Bitlis and Muş he met Ter-Avetisyan in Tiflis, who had returned from his 
expedition in the region where Falev was prepared to go. Ter-Avetisyan told the 
latter that, in the occupied regions the Muslim population was almost nonexistent 
and all the attainable Muslim manuscripts and books were collected and brought to 
Tiflis by himself. Thus, Falev gave up his plans for the ethnographical research and 
went to the Iranian Azerbaijan instead.28 
4.1.3 The Second Expedition of Ter-Avetisyan 
According to previous plans, instead of directing the exploration in Van, Marr 
intended to arrange an expedition to the places around the western shores of the Lake 
Van where Ter-Avetisyan did not visit in summer 1915. Since Marr opted to stay in 
Van during the summer of 1916, the expedition planned by N. Ya. Marr was 
conducted by Ter-Avetisyan in 1916, between 13 May and 5 September. The 
expedition began from Sarıkamış, proceeding to Köprüköy, Hasankale and Erzurum. 
                                                 
27 N. Ya. Marr, “Defekti ispolneniya pepologovsheisya organizatsii”, AAN F.800, o.1, d.1295, l.8 
28 P. A. Falev, “Otchet o poezdke v Zakavkaze i v Azerbaidzhan letom 1916 goda v svyazi s okhranoi 
pamyatnikov vostochnikh drevnostei na kavkazskom fronte”, Izvestiya Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 
Serial 6, Vol.11, nos. 1-11, (January-June, 1917), pp.171-176  
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From there, Ter-Avetisyan turned again towards Hasankale and Köprüköy, and 
visited Muş, Hınıs and Bitlis. With the accumulation of a significant collection, 
composed of manuscripts and some archaeological artifacts, Ter-Avetisyan returned 
to Tiflis for the safe transfer of this collection, and afterwards, traveled through 
Erzurum to Mamahatun and Erzincan. The director of the Caucasian Museum, A. N. 
Kaznakov, who after Erzurum returned to Van, accompanied Ter-Avetisyan.29 They 
spent 2 days to draw the plans of the fortress in Hasankale. On May 7, Ter-Avetisyan 
and Kaznakov arrived in Erzurum, and dealt with the documentation of the 
archaeological sites and artifacts in the city. The first place of attention had been the 
library, which was then in a chaotic situation. The library held manuscripts and 
printed books in Armenian and Ottoman, and books in French. They sent some of the 
books and manuscripts to Tiflis, and left the rest of the books (10.000 in amount) 
under the control of the nachalnik of Erzurum and requested the placement of the 
books at an Armenian church. The most important architectural monuments 
examined, described and photographed by Ter-Avetisyan were the buildings of the 
Seljukid period. They were the Çifte Minare, Ulu Cami, Yakutiye mosque [sic], city 
fortress, and several tombs at different locations in and around the city.30 On his way 
to Hınıs he photographed and examined an old bridge and in Hınıs penned 
descriptions of the fortress and the mosque. Then, Kaznakov left for Van, where he 
                                                 
29 S. V. Ter-Avetisyan, “Predvaritel’niy otchet po II komandirovke S. V. Ter-Avetisyana v zanyatiya 
russkimi voiskami chasti Turetskoi Armenii”, Izvestiya Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, (1916), p.1484 
30 Ter-Avetisyan, “Predvaritelniy otchet po II komandirovke”, p.1485 
 97 
made explorations of the caves and underground facilities of the fortress of Van, and 
published the results in the journal of the Caucasian Museum31  
Passing through the mountain of Bingöl, Ter-Avetisyan traveled alone to the 
right banks of Fırat River and visited the ruins of an ancient Armenian city, Ashtishat 
(village of Derik [Saltepe]), where he documented the ruins of the churches, and 
tombs of some Armenian saints (the first translators of Bible into Armenian). On 
May 21, his next stop was the village of Avran (Akören). He photographed the 
churches of St. Stephen and Surp Karabet [the Holy Forerunner, St. John the Baptist 
(Çengelli Kilise)], which were blown up by Turkish and Kurdish looters.32 Before 
his arrival some Armenian monks were sent to this area by the Catholicos of All-
Armenians to collect the manuscripts, which survived, so that Ter-Avetisyan, could 
not find any books or manuscripts there. On May 22, he arrived in Muş, 
photographed and conducted research in the churches and monasteries of the city. 
Finding out that the engraved wooden port of the Arakelotz [monastery of the 
Apostles], which was taken by Turks in order to sell it to a German scientist (Belk), 
was in Bitlis, he searched for the port and sent it to the Caucasian Museum.33 In 
Bitlis, he cooperated with the nachalnik of the city in his search for manuscripts, and 
photographed all the damaged buildings of churches and mosques in the city. 
Although he could not find any Armenian manuscripts, he purchased 300 samples of 
Muslim manuscripts for the Academy of Sciences. Furthermore, Ter-Avetisyan dealt 
with excavations in the environs of Bitlis. He dug in 3 mounds and found out 3 steles 
                                                 
31 A. N. Kaznakov, “Peshera s tainikami v Vanskoi Tsitateli”, Izvestiya Kavkazskogo Muzeya, Vol.11, 
no.1-2, (1917), pp.28-32 
32 ibid., p.1485 
33 ibid., p.1486 
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with inscriptions at the village of Dermet, and a fourth at the monastery of Surp 
Oganes, and sent these steles to Tiflis. 
Ter-Avetisyan found the monuments of Erzincan in a worse condition than 
the ones in Bitlis. His efforts to collect Armenian manuscripts were in vain, though, 
he managed to gather 600 Muslim manuscripts for the Academy of Sciences.34 Since 
the city itself did not posses any significant monument, Ter-Avetisyan had reported 
the descriptions of the monasteries around the city.35 
The Arabic manuscripts, which were collected by Ter-Avetisyan and 
delivered to the Aziatskii Museum of the Academy of Sciences, were studied by I. 
Yu. Krachkovskii. He prepared a categorical list of the manuscripts, which mainly 
consisted of interpretive auxiliary works (şerhs and haşiyes), and the original books 
on which the former had been written.36 On the Ottoman manuscripts on the other 
hand, P. A. Falev conducted research. This collection included many official 
documents, history, literature and grammar books, and divans of some prominent 
Ottoman poets. Falev classified the books categorically and chronologically in order 
to asses the evolution of the literary tradition.37 
4.1.4 The Expedition of Okunev 
Another archaeologist and former member of the Russian Archaeological 
Institute in Constantinople, sent by the Academy of Sciences, to the Caucasian Front, 
                                                 
34 “Ekspeditsiya Ter-Avetisyana”, Tiflisskii Listok, 28 August 1916, p.2 
35 Ter-Avetisyan, “Predvaritelniy otchet”, p.1487 
36 I. Yu. Krachkovskii, “Arabskie rukopisi postupivshiya v Aziatskii Muzei Rossiiskoi Akademii 
Nauk c Kavkazskogo Fronta”, Izvestiya Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, Serial 6, Vol. 11, (1917), pp.913-
949 
37 P. A. Falev, “Osmanskiya rukopisi postupivshiya v Aziatskii Muzei Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk c 
Kavkazskogo Fronta”, Izvestiya Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, Serial 6, Vol.12, nos.12-18, (September-
December, 1918), pp.1619-1630 
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was N. L. Okunev38 His task comprised the collection of the archaeological artifacts 
of the Christian civilizations in the occupied regions and organization of the 
protection of the archaeological monuments and sites he visited. Okunev had 
organized the program and the staff of his expedition in coordination with Ter-
Avetisyan, and the latter planned to join the expedition later. The expedition staff 
consisted of Okunev, the head of the expedition, A. Ya. Beloborodov, an 
archaeologist, and a photographer, Bul’benko, appointed by Ter-Avetisyan. The 
team gathered in Tiflis and left for Erzurum on 21 July 1916.  
First place of examination was Hasankale, where Ter-Avetisyan had worked 
before and where he would join the Okunev team. However, Ter-Avetisyan could 
not leave Tiflis and the Okunev expedition continued to work without Ter-
Avetisyan. They photographed the excavations that Ter-Avetisyan had made in 
Hasankale and investigated the Armenian monastery of Astvazazin. On 28 July 
1916, they arrived in Erzurum and shot the photographs of the Seljukid monuments 
of Çifte Minare and Yakutiye medreses and several tombs- kümbets. Çifte Minare 
and Yakutiye had been damaged during the previous Russo-Turkish wars of 1828 
and 1878. In 1829, when the Russian armies first occupied the city, some decorations 
on the portal of Yakutiye had been destroyed (i.e. the two-headed eagle)39, and when 
withdrawing, Russians took with them the carved doors of the mausoleum in Çifte 
Minare.40 During the 1916-18 occupation, the Çifte Minare was used as an arsenal, 
                                                 
38 N. L. Okunev (1886-1949): Professor of art history specialized on the architecture of Byzantium 
and slavic architecture, once a member of the Russain Archaeological Institute in Constantinople. 
39Gökçe Durmuşlu, “Yakutiye Medresesi”, in Erzurum Şehrindeki Tarihi Eserler, ed. Gürsoy Solmaz, 
(Erzurum: N.p., 2002) 
40 T. A. Sinclair, Eastern Turkey: An Architectural and Archaeological Survey, Vol. 2, (London: The 
Pindar Press, 1989), p.192 
 100 
and Yakutiye as barracks and workshops.41 The Okunev group also conveyed an 
inquiry about the structure of the social and administrative organizations of the 
Ottoman period, in Erzurum, though did not reach significant results.  
Cooperating with the military authorities, the Okunev expedition undertook a 
survey around Mamahatun. There, they examined the caravanserai and the tomb of 
Mamahatun and also visited the monastery at the village of Piçariç (Çadırkaya), and 
discovered an underground infrastructure at the ancient fortress. After Mamahatun, 
they arrived in Erzincan on 2 August and collected artifacts of Armenian antiquity 
with the help of the Armenian Charity Organization of Moscow, and explored the 
monastery of Perses Agrapet. Returning to Erzurum, the Okunev team accomplished 
the task of photographing the antiquities and then went to Bayburt on 12 August 
1916. In and around the city they photographed Armenian churches and monasteries 
and also prepared the plans of these buildings. In Bayburt, Beloborodov caught fever 
and returned to Russia, from then on Okunev continued on his expedition along the 
valley of Çoruh with the photographer.42  
The next place to examine was Ispir, where they had registered the church 
near the Turkish fortress with photographs. During their explorations at the villages 
of Kalekasrık, Danzurt, Arsis, Kiskim, the natives had assisted the scientists to locate 
and register the monuments of Dört Kilise, Parhal, İşhan, Öşk (Eoşk), and Haho 
(Hahul). The churches in this region were mainly Georgian churches of medieval 
                                                 
41 The Photo Archive of the Institute of the History for the Material Culture (Fotoarkhiv Instituta 
Istorii Materialnogo Kultura, St. Petersburg), Entry: 0.188.31/no.II.7847 (Yakutiye medresesi); 
O.188.15/no.II.7831 (Çifte Minare medresesi) 
42 N. L. Okunev, “Predvaritel’nyi Otchet privat-dotsenta Petrogradskogo Universiteta N. L. Okuneva 
o komandirovke letom 1917 goda na Kavkazskii front dlya okhrany pamyatnikov drevnosti i kultury”, 
Izvestiya Rossikogo Akademii Nauk, Serial 6, Vol. 11, (1917), p. 1438 
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ages.43 They had photographed and depicted the peculiarities of the churches in these 
villages, which were damaged severely during the turbulent years of war and 
deportation. Some of the churches, which had been used as military barracks during 
the war, were then used as barns and storages for food and hay, by the villagers. 
Okunev got in touch with the military authorities and the village administrations in 
order to prevent this usage and secure the preservation of the churches, which were 
also subject to damage by the Russian soldiers. The church in Hahul, which had been 
converted to a mosque during the Ottoman era, was intact and was reopened as a 
church upon the orders of the commander in the region.44 
Throughout the journey, the expedition team enjoyed the cooperation of 
military and civilian officers, and at the end of the expedition, Okunev delivered the 
documentation, the plans, maps and 500 photographs to the Russian Academy of 
Sciences.45 
4.1.5 The Expedition of Takaishvili 
The second phase of the Okunev expedition had been the survey of the Çoruh 
valley, in which mainly Georgian churches were placed. This region had been a 
focus of interest for the Georgian academic circles, who was referring to the region 
as the prolongation of Southern Georgia. The prominent Georgian archaeologist 
Ekvitime Takaishvili,46 had organized two expeditions to the regions of southern 
                                                 
43 Mine Kadiroglu, “Çoruh Havzası Ortaçağ Gürcü Mimarisi Araştırmaları”, Türk Arkeoloji ve 
Etnografya Araştırmaları Dergisi, no.1, (2000), pp.81-83 
44 Okunev, ibid., pp. 1435-1438 
45 The photographs shot by Bul’benko are currently among the collections of the The Photo Archive 
of the Institute of the History for the Material Culture of the Russian Academy of Sciences at St. 
Petersburg. 
46 E. S. Takaishvili (1863-1953): Georgian historian, archaeologist, philologist, pedagogue. He 
conducted studies on ancient Georgian manuscripts, ancient Georgian literature, and architectural, 
epigraphic monuments. (See R. Metreveli, Ekvtime Takaishvili, Tiflis, 1963) 
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Georgia, Ahıska, Ardahan, Kars and Oltu, which were under Russian rule, in 1902 
and 1907. Takaishvili found the opportunity to realize a third expedition to explore 
the monuments of Tao, Tortum and Ispir in the Çoruh basin, with the occupation of 
northeastern territories of Turkey by the Russian Army, in 1916. In early 1917, 
Georgian archaeologists visited the monasteries in the Çoruh basin47 and the 
Georgian Society of History and Ethnography, which was founded by Takaishvili, 
planned a detailed expedition in the summer of 1917.48 The Georgian aristocracy and 
Georgian church would sponsor the expenditures of this expedition, whereas 
transportation for the expedition would be arranged by the Caucasian Department of 
the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos. Civilian engineer A. N. Kolgin, artists Lado 
Gudiashvili and Mikhail Chiaureli, an architect, and the hieromonach Ippolit 
participated in the expedition. The hieromonach Ippolit would accompany the 
expedition staff in order to familiarize with the Georgian churches and after his 
return to Tiflis, he would organize their reconstruction and preservation. However, 
due to the withdrawal of the Russian Army this task could not be accomplished. 
They left Tiflis for the expedition on 21 July 1917, and passing through Oltu, 
the expedition team reached at Tortum and Hahul (Bağbaşı). The Hahul monastery 
and the Tortum fortress were examined and after the survey of the fortresses of 
Akçakale and Erseskale, the church in Ekeki was studied. On the route to İşhan and 
Oşk, Georgian scientists had registered the ruins of the churches near Isi alongside 
the huge churches of İşhan and Oşk. Initially the expedition was intended to 
                                                 
47 N. M. Shugurov, “Khohulskii Sobor”, Trapezondskii Voennyi Listok, 12 February 1917, p.4 
48 E. Takaishvili, Arkheologicheskaya ekspeditsiya 1917-go goda v yuzhniye provintsii Gruzii, Tiflis, 
1952, p.19. (Today the Ekvtime Takaishvili Society of Georgian History is a special subdivision of 
the Department of Social Sciences of the Georgian Academy of Sciences) 
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accomplish the detailed studies of the churches in the region between İşhan and 
Bayburt. However, Takaishvili sent some members of the expedition to Dört Kilise 
and Parhal for a preliminary examination of the churches there. This decision proved 
to be beneficial since a future expedition would not be possible after the withdrawal 
of the Russian Army in 1918. Both parts of the staff prepared detailed descriptions of 
the churches they had studied. The scientists drew the plans, took photographs, and 
read and deciphered inscriptions on the walls and on the steles.  
On their return to Tiflis, the expedition staff had associated with the members 
of the Uspenskii expedition to Trabzon, and improved and prepared the last variants 
of the plans. The results of this expedition were first disclosed in 1920 in an 
exhibition on ancient Georgian architecture and a catalog of the findings was 
prepared by Takaishvili, in Georgian and by D. P Gordeev, in Russian. All the 
materials gathered and prepared were placed in the Museum of the Georgian Society 
of Ethnography and History.49 
The results of this expedition had invaluable worth for knowledge on the 
Georgian architecture of the middle ages. As a result of this expedition, many 
unregistered churches were listed and studied, new scientific conclusions on the 
architectural styles of the churches were reached. The plans, which were drawn 
during this expedition, would serve as the main data for references in future studies 
since the churches were damaged, and many inscriptions, which were deciphered and 
explained during this research, disappeared in the following years.50  
                                                 
49 E. Takaishvili, Arkheologicheskaya ekspeditsiya 1917-go goda v yuzhniye provintsii Gruzii, (Tiflis: 
Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Gruzinskoi SSR, 1952), pp.17-22 
50 Mine Kadiroglu The Architecture of the Georgian Church at Ishan, European University Studies: 
Series 28. History of Art, Vol 121, 1991, p. 5 
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4.2 Archaeological Expeditions to the Southern Coasts of the Black Sea 
The southern coast of the Black Sea was the last territory that became 
accessible to the studies of Russian scientists, as Russian troops drove deep into the 
Ottoman territories. Newly conquered territories on the coast of the Black Sea had 
hosted between 1204-1461 the empire of Trebizond, which was founded by the 
members of a former Byzantine imperial family (The Comnenos). The empire 
comprised the entire southern coastal region of the Black Sea except its westernmost 
section. At the zenith of its wealth and power, the court of the emperors of Trebizond 
was a great artistic and cultural center, and thus the city had been the last refuge of 
the Byzantino-Greek civilization.51  
The interests of the Russian scientists in Trabzon were very much influenced 
by the previous studies of the Russian academicians in the field of Byzantinology 
and especially by the studies of the Russian Archaeological Institute in 
Constantinople. The institute, which was proposed to serve both as a scientific 
institute and as a prestigious lighthouse of the Russian civilization in the East,52 was 
opened on 10 March 1895.53 Feodor Ivanovich Uspenskii54, who had long been 
studying the problems of social and economic life in Byzantium, was appointed as 
                                                 
51 See: W. Miller, Trebizond, the last Greek Empire, (London: S.P.C.K., 1926) 
52 The institute had also served as a significant political asset, as it was envisioned by the Russian 
diplomatic society. In a memorandum to the Soviet government in October 1921, F. Uspenskii alleged 
that: “The two establishments [the Palestinian Society and the Russian Archaeological Institute in 
Constantinople] have one thing in common, a circumstance very few people realize here: that both the 
Palestinian Society and the institute in Constantinople had made it possible for us to compete with 
Western powers, and in such strategic places (in different respects) like Jerusalem and Constantinople. 
This competition had been going on for more than 25 years and it was -one could safely say- to 
Russia's credit.” Igor P. Medvedev, “The Saint-Petersburg -based Project: Archives of Russian 
Byzantinologists as a Source of the History of Science”, XX International Congress of Byzantine 
Studies, (19-25 August 2001), Paris: 2001, p.98 
53 E. Yu. Basargina, Russkii Arkheologicheskii Institut v Konstantinopole, (St. Petersburg: Dimitri 
Bulanin, 1999), p.22-29 
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the director of the institute.55 The institute organized many archaeological 
expeditions in and around the Ottoman Empire, in Istanbul, Iznik, Izmit, Trabzon, 
Syria, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Macedonia.56 The results of these studies were 
published in the sixteen volumes of its special publication, Izvestiya Russkogo 
Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole.  
Although the studies of the institute were interrupted by the outbreak of war 
after a 30-year period of existence, the institute was not legally abolished and the 
rapid advance of the Russian Army at the Caucasian Front reactivated the hopes of 
its reestablishment in Istanbul. The director of the institute, F. I. Uspenskii thus 
pioneered the efforts for the establishment of a special commission to organize the 
protection and research of the archaeological monuments in the newly occupied 
territories on the Black Sea coast, where his institute had conducted a preliminary 
research in 1895.  
4.2.1 The First Uspenskii Expedition to Trabzon (summer 1916) 
The Imperial Russian Archaeological Society convened a general meeting 
and at this meeting on 6 April 1916, decided to assemble in coordination with the 
Academy of Sciences, a commission for the preservation of the historical 
monuments of the occupied regions at the southern Black Sea coasts.57 The 
                                                                                                                                          
54 Feodor Ivanovich Uspenskii (1845-1928) Famous Byzantinologist, director of the Russian 
Archaeological Institute in Constantinople. 
55 A. A. Vasiliev, “Byzantine Studies in Russia: Past and Present,” The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 32, No. 3. (Apr., 1927), pp. 539-545 
56 Basargina, Russkii Arkheologicheskii, p.40 
57 Probably a military historical commission attached to the Caucasian Army was the first 
expeditionary team to visit Trabzon, on 19 April 1916. This commission was headed by a captain 
named Kolobov, and included the prominent artist, historian Georgii Kreskentyevich Lukomskii and a 
photograph. However, we do not have any evidence for the existence of such a commission other than 
a reference in the memoirs of Lev Bykovsky. Lev Bykovsky, Na Kavkazsko-Turetskomu Fronti: 
Spomyny z 1916-1918rr., (Denver: Pratsy Institutu Doslydyv Volyny, 1968), p.66 
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prospective members of the commission would be Fyodor Ivanovich Uspenskii, 
Fyodor Ivanovich Schmidt from the Imperial University of Kharkov, and Ya. I. 
Smirnov, a senior officer from the Imperial Hermitage. B. V. Farmakovskii informed 
the Grand Duke Georgii Mikhailovich about this decision and asked his approval and 
assistance in getting permission from the Ministry of Court and the Ministry of 
Public Enlightenment.58 The plans for this expedition were prepared in haste, even 
without consulting the members of the prospective commission other than F. I. 
Uspenskii, let alone consulting their institutions. Being aware of this fact, the Grand 
Duke Georgii Mikhailovich rejected the proposal and advised a well-thought out 
plan.59  
However, later in the summer of 1916, Uspenskii achieved his aim, and a 
special commission composed of Schmidt and artist N. K. Kluge had arrived in 
Trabzon on 13 May 1916, under the special permission of the Viceroy Grand Duke 
Nikolai Nikolayevich. The expenses of the expedition of this commission would be 
financed through the accounts of the temporarily closed Russian Archaeological 
Institute in Constantinople, and the scientists throughout the studies in Trabzon 
would use the official papers of the institute. Initially, the commission was declared 
to be in charge of the preservation of the archaeological artifacts and sites in the 
whole occupied area at the Black Sea coast. However, due to the continuation of 
military clashes in the territories around Trabzon and also due to the imminent and 
                                                 
58 RGIA F.530, o.1, d.63, l.3 
59 RGIA F.530, o.1, d.63, ll.7 reverse - 8. 
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huge task of protection of the monuments in the city, the commission confined its 
studies within the boundaries of the city center during the 1916 expedition.60  
Trabzon was not damaged by the war; however, the city had witnessed two 
destructive periods for the monuments. The first period was the deportation of the 
Armenians, and the second was the evacuation of the Muslim inhabitants. During 
both periods, the possessions and especially the temples of the respective 
communities were plundered, robbed and damaged by the people who remained.61 
Thus, the expedition team set forth the preservation of the temples of the forsaken 
inhabitants, especially the Muslims, as a primary task.62 Prikaz no.11763 of the 
Viceroy had laid the legal basis for this task. By this Prikaz all the mosques, which 
had been converted form churches centuries ago, were closed for Muslim prayer and 
were left under the authority of the archaeological commission. The closure of the 
mosques for Muslim worshipping did not make much sense since the Muslim 
population in the city was only about twenty persons, at the moment that the Russian 
Army entered the city.64 The importance of the Prikaz was that, it did not transfer the 
former-churches to the Greek authorities of the city, and this fact would be a matter 
of conflict between the Greek population and members of the archaeological 
expedition. Hence, the keys of 12 church-cum-mosques were handed to the 
expeditionary team of Uspenskii, and the team commenced its work in the mosques 
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of Ayasofya, Orta Hisar and Yeni Cuma, the former churches of St. Sophia, 
Chrysocephalos and St. Eugene respectively.  
Schmidt and artist Kluge made a detailed and systematic study of the church 
of St. Sophia.65 The church was constructed during the time of Emperor Manuel I 
(1238-1263) and constituted one of the finest monuments of the Byzantine era. It had 
been converted to a mosque in 1573,66 and during the First World War, the Turkish 
military authorities used it as a warehouse and military hospital and then once again 
as a mosque. Schmidt and Kluge removed the plaster covering the frescos on the 
walls, and the wooden floor over the mosaics. Kluge prepared the plans of the church 
and drew watercolor copies of the frescos.67 When the work in St. Sophia was at its 
climax, a personal conflict between Uspenskii and Schmidt broke out. Uspenskii 
ordered the termination of the studies. An annoyed Schmidt left Trabzon in 31 June 
and Kluge on 18 July.68 Thus, Uspenskii, who had stayed in Trabzon till 8 October 
1916, had to continue the work alone. The septuagenerian academician did not have 
the necessary strength to undertake this task and was aided by the acting nachalnik 
of the fortified region, Sergei Rudolfovich Mintslov.69 The latter had been interested 
in archaeological artifacts70 and till the arrival of the Uspenskii commission had 
made surface research in the city.71  
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Uspenskii and Mintslov studied the church of St. Eugene or the Yeni Cuma 
Mosque. The Church of Saint Eugene is located south of the city of Trebizond. The 
church was dedicated to Saint Eugene whom Alexius Comnenus (1204-1222) 
declared patron saint of the city, building it in the same place where he had been 
buried after being martyred. Uspenskii and Mintslov exposed the mosaic floor, and 
made some excavations in and around the church, and, unearthed an ancient 
skeleton, which they claimed to belong to St. Eugene. However, Uspenskii was not 
satisfied with the expertise and methods of Mintslov, so he dismissed the latter from 
the studies.72 Uspenskii seemed to be more concerned about the ignorance of the 
local Greeks about the patron saint of the city, St. Eugene, rather than the church 
dedicated to him. He desperately searched for the icon of St. Eugene, but eventually 
came to the conclusion that even the memory of the saint had long faded away, let 
alone any material relics.73  
The last monument to be studied in Trabzon during the summer of 1916 was 
the Orta Hisar Mosque or the former Church of Chrysocephalos. It was the Cathedral 
of the Comnenos dynasty and was dedicated to the Virgin Mary. It had been named 
after the Virgin Panaghia Chrysocephalos, which meant ‘Golden Head,’ due to the 
golden halo of one of the statues. The building was in good condition. While 
exploring the building and its environs Uspenskii and Mintslov had noticed the 
strange architecture of a türbe (tomb) next to the church. The türbe was dedicated to 
Hoşoğlan, a legendary Muslim martyr of the siege of Trabzon in 1461. However, the 
building of the türbe resembled a basilica, and making further research on it, 
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Uspenskii disclosed crosses on the four columns of the building. Since the türbe was 
in the court of the church of Chrysocephalos, which was used as the graveyard of the 
emperors of Trebizond, Uspenskii decided that the türbe had originally belonged to 
an emperor. Uspenskii demanded the commander to raze the shabby dwellings 
abandoned by the Muslims around the türbe, and the latter fulfilled this request 
during the construction works for new and broad roads in the city.74 Uspenskii 
excavated the türbe with the assistance of F. M. Morozov, an archaeologist then 
working at a field hospital,75 and dug out two skeletons, one belonging to a beheaded 
Muslim and the other to an emperor of Trebizond, buried in a sarcophagus. Later on, 
interpreting the information given in the Greek chronicles, Uspenskii came to the 
conclusion that the second skeleton belonged to the emperor Alexius IV of 
Trebizond. Uspenskii handed the relics of the emperor to the Metropolitan of 
Trabzon, Phillipides Chrysanthos,76 and the latter took them along while leaving 
Trabzon and afterwards buried them in Thessaloniki.77  
During the expedition of 1916, Uspenskii collected a great number of Islamic 
books, manuscripts and documents. These were packed and sealed with the stamp of 
the Archaeological Institute in Constantinople and the most precious ones were sent 
to Petrograd to be delivered to the Imperial Academy of Sciences. The rest of the 
materials were stored in the temporarily established library and museum by 
Uspenskii, in Orta Hisar Mosque (the former church of Chrysocephalos), where 
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before the Russian occupation the Turkish administration had founded a library with 
10,000 books.78 In this temporary museum and library, which was located at the 
center of the city and relatively well protected, Uspenski placed his own library, his 
collections of books and artifacts, and also the findings of Mintslov.79 Before leaving 
the city on 8 October 1916, Uspenskii turned over the keys of the mosques (former 
churches) to Mintslov, the acting nachalnik of the fortified region, entrusting the 
preservation of the temporary museum and other churches until resumption of the 
academic studies the following summer.80 
I. Yu Krachkovskii studied the manuscripts delivered to the Imperial Russian 
Acedemy of Sciences by Uspenskii. The manuscripts consisted of 17 Korans all 
belonging to 19th century but for one. Since among the collections in Petrograd there 
were Korans dating back to 7th century, the ones brought from Trabzon did not create 
much special interest.81 Uspenskii was also conscious of this, but he intended to use 
these and the rest of the manuscripts as a bargaining chip for the confiscated library 
of the Russian Institute in Constantinople.  
4.2.2 The Second Uspenskii Expedition to Trabzon  
Uspenskii had arrived in Trabzon, in the summer of 1917, as he had planned 
the previous year. However, then the political conditions in the city had drastically 
changed. In 1916, Uspenskii was a respected archaeologist who was working under 
the aegis of the Viceroy at the Caucasus, and he was an intimate friend of the 
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commander of the fortified region, Major General Schwartz. Following the 
revolutionary changes in the administrative structure of the occupied regions, 
Uspenskii lost his privileged status. Besides, the Russian administration itself 
assumed a shaky existence, and new authorities emerged in the city, the most 
important of which was the Metropolitan of Trabzon. The Greek population was 
busy with attempts to acquire patronage of the city, and harbored aspirations over the 
former-churches, which were left under the control of the academic expeditions. The 
Greeks founded a local archaeological society headed by a participant of the last 
year’s expedition to obtain the control of these monuments.82 
The physical conditions of these monuments were worse than the political 
situation of the city. Since the previous administration had been abolished, the 
security of the former churches was in abeyance. The Russian soldiers and natives 
had broken into these former churches, plundered the commodity and destroyed the 
buildings. Before initiating a new archaeological expedition, Uspenskii then decided 
to ascertain the scale of damage incurred upon the former churches. For this purpose, 
he assembled a commission with the participation of the representatives of the city 
administration, police and the new commander of the fortified region.  
The Ortahisar Mosque, the former church of Chrysocephalos, which was used 
as a temporary museum and library, was plundered; all the documents and books 
other than he packed were dispersed, during the turbulent days of the Russian 
revolution. The mosque was used first as a field hospital and then as military 
barracks. The mosque of Yeni Cuma (the former church of St. Eugene) was robbed 
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of its paintings, wooden structure, and was partially damaged. The doors of the Aya 
Sofya mosque were also broken; all wooden material had been dismantled and 
removed. The mosques, former churches, of Ismailbaba and Karabet Camii had 
shared the same fate too.83 
The expedition of 1917 had a larger staff than the 1916 expedition. The team 
consisted of Ahafanhel E. Krymskii, N. D. Protasov, A. E. Makarenko, N. B. 
Baklanov, N. K. Kluge, and G. K. Meier.84 The expeditionary staff commenced their 
works at the end of June 1917. Krymskii with his assistant concentrated his studies in 
the destroyed library and museum of the Ortahisar Mosque. They rearranged the 
manuscripts and books into respective categories. They paid great attention to the 
preservation of legal documents since these were the sole evidences for the 
prospective ownership regulations after the return of the Muslim inhabitants of the 
city. This effort aroused disturbance among the Greek population, who had occupied 
the abandoned dwellings and stores of the Muslims. In July 1917, the local society of 
archaeology organized a public visit to the mosque, to which hundreds of Greeks 
flooded and interrupted the studies of the scientists. A few days later, thieves broke 
into the mosque and stole some documents and books.85 After the cessation of the 
activities of the 1917 expedition, Krymskii continued his studies in the city with the 
cooperation of members of the Ukrainian Community (Ukrainska Gromada). Then, 
the scientist surveyed the acropolis and the Hellenic temple of Artemis in Trabzon.86 
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N. B. Baklanov, on the other hand, conducted a surface research at the ruins 
of the city walls and the palace. Since the ruins were inhabited by Muslim refugees 
and due to the absence of required equipment, Baklanov could not accomplish the 
task, though he managed to take photographs. Baklanov managed to make a detailed 
measurement of the Yeni Cuma Mosque (the former church of St. Eugene), and later 
published the results of this study with the description of the Ortahisar Mosque (the 
former church of Chrysecephalos).87 Meanwhile, N. D. Protasov worked on the 
iconographic material and other figurative paintings of the churches of St. Eugene, 
Chrysecephalos, St. Sophia and St. John near Cevizlik.88 Uspenskii assigned the 
exploration of the fortress, and the church at the palace, to A. E. Makarenko, and the 
latter had draw the plan of the fortress and copied the frescos in the church.89 A 
representative of the Moscow Archaeological Society took photographs of the 
historical monuments of Trabzon, upon the request of Count A. A. Bobrinskii. All 
other members of the expedition also took pictures of the archaeological artifacts 
they were working on and the artist General G. K. Meier drew the pictures of the 
acropolis, the churches of St. Eugene, St. Sophia, Chrysocephalos, Panagia-Kerula 
(the Mosque of Karabet), the fortress, the ruins of the palace, the tomb of Alexius IV. 
The artist Kluge on the other hand, copied the icons and frescos in the churches.90  
Although the 1917 expedition had to be performed in a chaotic and hostile 
atmosphere, its results proved much more beneficial than those of the previous year. 
The Russian scientists could only work at the places, which were designated as sites 
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for academic research. They could not extend their research areas to the active Greek 
churches or libraries and their access to these places was prevented.91 As it was the 
case in the mosque of Ortahisar, the scientific efforts had disturbed the Greek 
residents and incurred hostility in the form of a forced visit and robbery. It was 
interesting that the Muslims and the Muslim Charitable Society of Baku offered 
every kind of help during the studies of the scientists.92 Assessing all the unfavorable 
conditions, Uspenskii had stayed in the city after the departure of the other members 
of the expedition till October, for the arrangement of necessary regulations to secure 
the monuments and collected materials. He applied to the Special Commission for 
Transcaucasia (OZAKOM) for the protection of the monuments. Since the 
OZAKOM did not possess real authority and even lost all its powers by the time 
Uspenskii applied,93 it could not take any precautions other than offering some 
advice. Uspenskii, in turn, initiated the formation of a commission responsible of the 
security of the monuments in September 1917. The commission consisted of the 
representatives of the commander of the fortified region and the city administration 
and the Mufti. However, it was obvious that, this commission was a stillborn entity 
as it was the last months of 1917. 
Another scientific study carried out in the summer of 1917 in Trabzon was, 
the biological survey of Dr. Vitold Eichler. He was a specialist of insectology, and 
was appointed to the army staffs in charge of biological explorations at the war 
fronts. He had served in 1915 at the German Front and in the autumn of 1915 was 
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transferred to the Caucasian Front. His studies in Trabzon started in August 1916 and 
after a long period of sickness, were accomplished in July 1917. He had traveled in 
the Trabzon region and collected 5000 examples of beetles in the towns and villages 
of Görele, Cevizlik, Hamsiköy, Daltaban, Kelkit, Sadak, Kesse, Ardese, and 
Zigana.94 
4.3 An Unsuccessful Attempt for a General Expedition in Eastern and 
Northeastern Anatolia 
During the first months of 1917, a special department under the Governor-
Generalship of the occupied regions was established to centralize the archaeological 
studies in the territory of the Governor-Generalship. The Archaeological Department 
under the Governor-Generalship was headed by an active member of the Russian 
Military-Historical Society, the Commission for the Studies of the Antiquities of 
Moscow, the Archaeological Society of Moscow and the Society for the Studies of 
the Historical Monuments, Ignatii Yakovlevich Stelletskii.95  
In consultation with Ter-Avetisyan, Stelletskii had been planning an 
ambitious expedition, which would cover the whole area under the authority of the 
Governor-Generalship. After the discovery of an elaborate underground gallery from 
the time of the kingdom of Bagratids, near the village of Piçariç (Çadırkaya)96, and 
after the robbery of treasure hunters at the mound near Hasankale, Stelletskii 
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enhanced his attempts to organize a detailed expedition in the whole region of the 
occupied areas. He received official assignment from the Governor-General of the 
occupied regions of Turkey on 29 April 1917.97 Before he could realize the 
expedition, however, the administrative structure of the occupied regions underwent 
radical alterations. Unyielding against the ignorance of the new administration, 
Stelletskii tried to arouse public consciousness about the preservation and studies of 
the historical monuments through publishing articles in the Tiflis newspapers in May 
1917, and propagating his projects to social organizations. In an article in 
Kavkazskoe Slovo, he depicted the treasures stolen from Hasankale (part of which 
was then found and delivered to the Hermitage in Petrograd) and insisted on the 
necessity of conducting systematic studies on the archaeological treasures of the 
region by the participation of the local intelligentsia.98 Later in May 1917, he 
summoned a meeting of the representatives of the local social organizations and got 
their support for his project.99  
Meanwhile, Stelletskii applied to the new Commander-in-Chief of the 
Caucasian Army, General Nikolai Nikolayevich Yudenich, who directed the project 
of Stelletskii to the newly formed Special Commission for Transcaucasia.100 Then, 
Stelletskii personally presented his project to the Special Commission for 
Transcaucasia, and on 2 June 1917 appealed with an emotional letter to the 
commissar of the Provisional Government for the Administration of the occupied 
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regions.101 Although both institutions approved the necessity of such an expedition, 
Stelletskii’s project could not be brought into existence, during the chaotic year of 
1917. 
Concluding Remarks 
The years of Russian occupation had been an important period for scientific 
expeditions by the Russian scientists, who were familiar with the history, 
archaeology, and ethnography of the region. The results of these studies were of 
great value. However, all the expeditions were to varying extents crippled by 
wartime conditions. The ethnographic studies could not even be realized, whereas, 
the Marr expedition to Van, had to be ceased after 2 months of study due to the 
tactical withdrawal of the Russian Army in July 1916. Besides, many scientists, 
including Uspenskii, were seriously infected by epidemics, and the studies were 
either delayed, or cancelled. Eventually, the Russian revolution of 1917 put an end to 
all studies. 
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5. CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The situation on the Caucasian Front in 1917 was dire for the Turkish side. It 
had lost almost all the important defense positions and transportation facilities along 
with an enormous number of soldiers. The Russian side, on the other hand, was 
consolidating its rule in the area, improving the supply lines, and planning to initiate 
a new decisive campaign in cooperation with the British forces in Mesopotamia. This 
collaborative campaign “over the whole area between the Black Sea and the Persian 
Gulf”1 could never be realized due to the outbreak of the March 1917 Revolution in 
Petrograd. The impact of the revolution on the Russian Army was disastrous. The 
Russian Caucasian Army, as well as the army at the German Front, disintegrated 
throughout 19172, and as a consequence of the November 1917 events in Petrograd, 
“demobilization became spontaneous even before the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, 
[between the delegates of the Central Powers and Russians] had begun.”3 At that 
point, the new commander of the Caucasian Army, Mikhail Alekseevich Przhevalskii 
could not decline Vehib Pasha’s proposal for a truce. The two parties signed the 
truce in Erzincan on 18 December 1917, which required the cessation of all military 
operations, and the preservation of the front line at the positions held by the Russian 
and Turkish armies since the winter of 1916-1917.4 
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However, “the Erzincan Truce did not stem the tide of desertion”5 and took a 
character of withdrawal by December 1917. The extended frontline was left to the 
control of the urgently formed Armenian forces with the assistance and participation 
of a few Russian officers and soldiers. Protesting against the outrages of the 
disbanded Russian soldiers and the massacres of Muslims committed by Armenian 
bands, Vehib Pasha launched a rapid advance. Erzincan was conquered on 13 
February 1918, then followed Bayburt, and Erzurum. On February 24 the Turkish 
Army entered Trabzon and Mamahatun (Tercan). Thus, the Ottoman forces had 
reached the 1914 borders by spring 1918, and the period of Russian occupation came 
to an end. 
The Russian armies occupied two important areas during the First World 
War. In the early stages of the war, Russian troops invaded the Austro-Hungarian 
part of Galicia in August 1914 and occupied the area until May 1915. The second 
territory was the Eastern, and Northeastern regions of Anatolia, which stayed under 
Russian occupation roughly between April 1916 and February 1918. Right after the 
victorious advance of the Russian armies, Russian governmental and military 
authorities contemplated the reorganization of the administration and economic life 
in the occupied areas of the Austro-Hungarian6 and Ottoman empires. The conquered 
regions of both empires were transformed into temporary military governor-
generalships, which were headed by military officers. The system of military 
governor-generalship in remote areas of the Russian Empire had proved to be 
                                                 
5 Richard G. Hovannisisan, Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1967), p.110 
 121 
successful in the 19th century,7 especially in the conquered territories of Turkestan. 
The Russian Imperial Government had established the temporary military governor-
generalship of Turkestan in 1867, where the civil and military power had been 
concentrated in the hands of military authorities.8 The first military governor-general 
of Turkestan, General Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufmann established a firm 
Russian rule to restore order while native customs and institutions were left intact.9 
Tsar Nicholas II ratified ‘the Rules for the Temporary Administration of the 
Occupied Regions of Turkey by the Law of War’ on 18 June 1916, and Major 
General Nikolai Nikolayevich Peshkov was appointed as the first Military Governor 
General of the occupied regions in Turkey. He would submit to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Caucasian Army, the Viceroy at the Caucasus, Grand Duke Nikolai 
Nikolayevich, who had the responsibility over the occupied area until the 
appointment of the military governor-general. The military governor-general was the 
retired temporary general-governor of the Kharkov guberniya. In his new post, 
Peshkov initiated the establishment of the structure of the administration in the 
occupied regions. Meanwhile, under the supervision of military commanders, the 
first projects of colonization and exploitation of the resources in the occupied 
territories were commenced.  
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However, the activities of the military governor-generalship for the 
centralization of the administration proved to be ineffective and hindered the 
initiated efforts of colonization and exploitation of the area. The appointments of the 
officials to the territorial subdivisions (oblasts and okrugs) were delayed until 
January 1917, which resulted in the continuation of the power vacuum especially in 
remote areas and exasperated the miserable life conditions of the population. 
Peshkov retarded the colonization and resettlement projects till the signature of the 
ultimate peace treaty, which was expected to legally incorporate the region to the 
Russian Empire. Moreover, he never visited the occupied regions and stayed in his 
chancellery in Tiflis throughout his tenure10. This situation necessitated the 
intervention of the Viceroy. He visited important cities under occupation, such as 
Erzurum, Erzincan and Trabzon, inspected the activities of the regional officers and 
interfered in the relief efforts. The replacement of the military governor-general did 
not help in the turbulent year of 1917. The following months after March 1917, 
witnessed the emerging of new power bases such as the revolutionary ispolnitel’nyi 
komitets (executive committees) among the soldiers of the Russian army and among 
the native population of the occupied regions. For example, in Trabzon, besides the 
local executive committee of the Greeks, Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish soldiers 
established separate executive committees.11 Projects of colonization, research for 
natural resources, and construction efforts were left incomplete amidst these 
conditions. 
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‘The Rules for the Temporary Administration of the Occupied Regions of 
Turkey by the Law of War’ underlined an important change in the attitude of the 
Russian Imperial Government towards the Armenian population of the occupied 
regions. Before the war, Russia had mastered reform projects to be implemented in 
Eastern Anatolia, trying to establish a “Turkish Armenia under the Russian 
protectorate.”12 The ‘Armenian reforms of 1914’ were to a great extent in line with 
the Russian proposal, which projected to grant considerable autonomy to the six 
provinces of eastern Anatolia, under a European inspector-general. With the 
interference of Germany and Britain, the Ottoman Government avoided the 
formation of a united autonomous region, but assented to the establishment of two 
inspector-generalships with the addition of Trabzon to the six vilâyets.13 The 
outbreak of the war hindered the implementation of these reforms, however, already 
by spring 1916, the Russian armies invaded the “six vilâyets”, and the Russian 
government was free to implement the prewar projects, had it wished to do so. 
To the dismay of the euphoric Armenian activists in Russia and in Europe 
(the Armenian National Delegation in Paris), the ‘Rules for the Temporary 
Administration of the Occupied Regions of Turkey by the Law of War’ required total 
submission of the population to the Russian suzerainty. There were no references to 
any national identification. The only issues related to nationality were found in the 
clauses on the judicial system, where, the Sharia was referred to as the primary 
source for the resolution of cases between the Muslim population. Other than this, all 
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13 Salahi R. Sonyel, The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy, (London: K. 
Rustem & Brother, 1987), p.284 
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ethnic groups proclaimed to be equal before the Russian law, and the rural 
administrations were to be in conformity with the ethnic structure of respective rural 
administrative units.  
Furthermore, all the appointed nachalniks but that of Van, were ethnically of 
Russian or Cossack origin. All colonization projects envisaged the settlement of the 
Russian subjects, especially the Cossacks, and the bulk of the settlers would be 
formed by the special regiments in charge of the production of fodder and food in 
occupied areas. Armenians and Georgian were not included in these regiments. 
Besides, the commanders of the Caucasian Army and later the Governor-Generalship 
did not allow the resettlement of the refugees, mainly the Armenians.14 These 
refugees were only temporarily permitted to cultivate land in order to alleviate the 
immediate difficulties of supply of the army and the needs of the population. 
Whereas the military administrative authorities maintained a less than 
favorable attitude towards the refugees, many Russian and international 
philanthropic societies were engaged with intensive and extensive relief operations 
in occupied regions. The main objective of aid was the Armenian refugees, whose 
suffering had been an international matter of concern for some years. Although the 
Armenians had a preferential status for these societies, the Muslim inhabitants also 
benefited from relief, especially organized by Muslim philanthropic societies of the 
Russian Empire. The Muslim soldiers and officers of the Russian Army also 
participated in relief for the Muslim population, and they even played a great role in 
checking the atrocities committed by the Armenian bands during the tumultuous year 
                                                 
14 J. Kirakosyan, Zapadnaya Armenia v Gody Pervoi Mirovoi Voiny, Erevan: (Izdatel’stvo 
Erevanskogo Universiteta, 1971), p.422 
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of 1917. The relief organizations and the political nonintervention of the Russian 
administration in the functions of the local institutions and in the local traditions, 
assured the Muslim population of the goodwill of the Russian rulers. The Muslim 
inhabitants of the places, which fell under the Russian occupation in the summer of 
1916, did not flee,15 whereas the Muslim population of Van, Erzurum, and Trabzon 
had fled with the withdrawal of the Turkish Army in the early stages of the war in 
1915-1916. 
The colonization projects trying to allocate land for Russian settlers, the 
construction plans to facilitate the exploitation of the resources, and the structure of 
the temporary military administration, which aimed at restoring order while retaining 
the local institutions and traditions were all in line with the historical process of 
Russian expansionism, which might be defined by the Russian term, osvoenie.16 The 
term osvoenie was used interchangeably with the term kolonizatsia (colonization), 
though the former had a broader connotation. The osvoenie process required 
familiarization with occupied territory while mastering over the people and resources 
of the region. For this purpose, The Caucasian Archaeographical Commission17 and 
the Tashkent Branch of Society of Amateurs of Natural Science, Anthropology, and 
                                                 
15 Sabri Özcan San, Rusların Gümüşhane İlini İşgali, (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 
1993), p.68 
16 Osvoenie: the substantive form of the verb osvoit, which means, to appropriate, to learn to master, 
assimilate or familiarize oneself with. In connection with the Russian colonial expansion the term was 
used more in the sense of a strategy to appropriate and assimilate a territorial space. 
17 Caucasian Archaeographical Commission: The scientific institute founded in Tiflis with the 
initiative of the Russian authorities in 1864. The Commission published Akty Sobrannnye Kavkazskoi 
Arkheographicheskoi Komissieyu between 1866 and 1904 in twelve volumes. The original material 
covered a wide range from history, to politics, to economics, to religion and contains information 
revealing the political structures of the Caucasian region and the details of administration under the 
Russian Viceroys. The colonial policy Russian government had an effect on the selection of the 
documents in which basic attention was directed on the origins and the evolution of wars and 
boundary disputes within the region. 
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Ethnography18 had been formed with the initiatives of the Russian imperial 
governments, in order to study the ethnography, history and archaeology of occupied 
areas, Caucasus and Turkestan respectively. 
The Turkish territories under occupation were not an exception to this 
practice. Leading academic institutions of the Russian Empire assigned academicians 
with the purpose of conducting ethnographical, archaeological, botanical and 
geographical studies in the region. The botanical and geographical studies, which 
aimed at exploring soil productivity and land allocation for future colonization of 
occupied areas, which were sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture, were realized 
to a limited extent due to wartime conditions and due to the restrictions imposed by 
the military authorities. Ethnographical research could not be undertaken since the 
wartime conditions radically altered the ethnic makeup of the region. On the other 
hand, archaeological studies proved to be successful and fruitful in comparison to 
other scientific studies. However, even the archaeological studies preponderantly had 
a preliminary survey character. Although the results of the Ter-Avetisyan, Marr, 
Uspenskii, and Takaishvili expeditions made revelations, which could not be 
surpassed to this very day, these expeditions also could not fulfill their ultimate 
objectives. 
The Russian Revolutions of 1917 “that shook the World” constituted a force 
majeure to devastate the last osvoenie project of a region, which was conquered by 
the Russian Army and recognized as a war trophy in the secret agreements of the 
First World War. 
                                                 
18 Daniel Brower, Islam and Ethnicity”, in Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-
1917, Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini eds., (Bloomington, and Indianapolis: Indiana 
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